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A B S T R ACT. What deference is due the executive in foreign relations? Given the
considerable constitutional authority and institutional virtues of the executive in this realm,
some judicial deference is almost certainly appropriate. Indeed, courts currently defer to the
executive in a large number of cases. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein nevertheless call for a
dramatic expansion in the deference that courts accord executive interpretations of law in the
foreign affairs context. They maintain that courts should presumptively give Chevron-style
deference to executive interpretations of foreign relations law - even if the executive
interpretation is articulated only as a litigation position, and even if it violates international law.
In our view, substantial deference to the executive is singularly inappropriate in a large swath of
cases eligible for Chevron deference under their proposal -namely, those involving foreign
relations law that operates in what we call the "executive-constraining zone." Courts have
scrutinized, and should continue to scrutinize, executive interpretations of international law that
has the status of supreme federal law, that is made at least in part outside the executive, and that
conditions the exercise of executive power. Failure to do so would undermine the rule of law in
the foreign relations context. It would also dramatically increase the power of the President in
ways that would subvert the nation's interests, discourage the executive from developing
important internal checks on presidential power, and lead to less congressional regulation of the
executive. In short, we maintain that deference at some point invites disregard and that law-
interpreting authority at some point effectively constitutes lawbreaking authority.
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INTRODUCTION
What role should courts play in the interpretation and application of
foreign relations law? One important aspect of this question is whether and
when courts should second-guess the executive on matters that implicate
foreign relations. This issue is as difficult as it is important. On the one hand,
the executive has both unique institutional virtues and substantial
constitutional authority when it comes to foreign affairs. On the other hand,
this sphere of government activity is increasingly governed by law-law that
both purports to regulate the actions of the executive and that is made at least
in part outside the executive. The upshot is that although some deference is
almost certainly often warranted, too much deference risks precluding effective
regulation of executive action.
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein call for a dramatic expansion in the
deference that courts accord executive interpretations of law in the foreign
affairs context.' They maintain that courts should defer to the executive in a
broad class of cases, even if the executive interpretation is articulated only as a
litigation position and even if the executive's interpretation is inconsistent with
international law.' Of course, courts do, in fact, often defer to the executive in
foreign affairs cases.' Nevertheless, Posner and Sunstein urge that even greater
deference is required.4 In their view, the proper scope of deference is limited
only by a narrow range of underspecified nondelegation canons and a
"reasonableness" inquiry analogous to that articulated in the line of
administrative deference cases starting with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.' Although Chevron-style deference formally
preserves some role for the judiciary to review executive interpretations for
1. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170 (2007).
2. See id. at 1204-07. Indeed, Posner and Sunstein favor an expansion of the executive's
authority to violate international law-presumably even when such law is part of the
supreme law of the land.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 14-24.
4. Indeed, they suggest that courts should defer to the executive not only in the class of cases in
which these existing doctrines properly apply, but also on the question of whether these
deferential doctrines should apply to a specific case in the first place. See, e.g., Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1204-07.
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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their "reasonableness," courts conducting such review rarely invalidate agency
action.6 Despite this fact, Posner and Sunstein insist that
[r]eview of executive interpretations for reasonableness nonetheless
should be expected to have a significant function. It would, for
example, raise questions about apparently arbitrary differences across
time or across nations, as in an executive judgment that the civil rights
statutes apply in England and Germany but not in France and Italy; any
such judgment would have to be explained.7
These claims, though, are difficult to square with the very reasons why, in
their view, Chevron deference is appropriate in foreign relations law in the first
place. As we explain more fully below, Posner and Sunstein claim that robust
deference is appropriate in the foreign relations realm precisely because the
application of this law almost always turns on case-specific judgments of
prediction and value -judgments that the flexible, energetic, and accountable
executive is well suited to make.' The upshot is that Chevron-style deference of
the sort they propose would radically expand the authority of the executive to
interpret and, in effect, to break foreign relations law.
We disagree with their approach. We believe that it would have been a bad
idea at the Founding and is an even worse idea today. We are motivated to
respond to Posner and Sunstein not simply because of the increasing
importance of this issue in the wake of the treacherous attacks of September 11,
2001, but also because we fear that the innovative proposal by these
accomplished academics may lead courts down a path that would depart from
longstanding precedent at a crucial moment in the development of
international law, particularly international humanitarian law.
Posner and Sunstein are absolutely right to acknowledge that their theory
has "radical implications."9 If enacted into law, it would upend centuries of
precedent and give the President a power that no court has ever given the
6. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation ofChevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (2006) (finding that a very small percentage
of cases invalidate agency decisions as unreasonable).
7. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1198 n.9o.
8. See id. at 1204-12. To clear the "reasonableness" hurdle envisioned by Posner and Sunstein,
the executive would need only to suggest that the seemingly arbitrary application of foreign
relations law was guided by judgments of prediction and value -simply indicating with
respect to any treaty obligation that, perhaps, some countries were more likely to
reciprocate, or that cooperation with some other countries, even if fully realized, offered
little material benefit to the United States.
9. Id. at 1177.
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executive. It would accelerate the trend of circumventing Congress in key
decisions involving war powers and civil liberties and would be in tension with
the separation of powers our Founders laced into the Constitution. While such
a claim might be temporarily plausible in emergency situations in which
Congress cannot act, and in others in which there are strong executive branch
processes that have done the hard work of earning deference, they are not
appropriate in all situations.
In our view, Posner and Sunstein's proposal threatens to undermine the
rule of law by radically increasing the executive branch's capacity to interpret
and to break the law under its foreign relations power-even when the law's
purpose is to restrict that very power. Our position is straightforward: we
maintain that increased judicial deference to the executive in the foreign
relations domain is inappropriate. Two broad claims structure our defense of
this view and our critique of the Posner and Sunstein proposal. First, current
deference doctrines, some peculiar to foreign relations law and some not, cover
the vast majority of examples in which deference is warranted. The burden that
Posner and Sunstein must carry is to demonstrate convincingly that their
proposal prescribes judicial deference in circumstances not otherwise eligible
for robust deference. The circumstances in which their proposal does so
include, most prominently, executive interpretations of international law that
operate in what we call the "executive-constraining zone." This zone refers to
the domain of foreign relations law, particularly international law, that (1) has
the status of supreme federal law, (2) is made at least in part outside the
executive, and (3) conditions the exercise of executive power.
Our second claim, broadly conceived for the moment, is that substantial
judicial deference to executive interpretations of international law is
inappropriate, at a minimum, in the executive-constraining zone. International
law operating in this zone includes self-executing treaties and statutes
incorporating international law either explicitly, as in the case of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provisions central to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,'° or implicitly, as in the case of the 2001
1o. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). In Hamdan, the Court held that the President lacked authority to
proceed with trials by military commissions as contemplated in then-existing military
regulations. The Court concluded that no act of Congress expressly authorized the President
to employ commissions as then constituted. The Court noted that the UCMJ provision
authorizing trials by military commission explicitly does so only to the extent permitted by
the law of war. The contemplated commissions were inconsistent with at least one
applicable aspect of the international law of war- Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC].
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Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).1 ' Substantial deference in
this context cannot be squared with the doctrinal and institutional implications
that necessarily follow from the status of these international instruments as
"law." In our view, the courts must retain the institutional prerogative to
interpret law in this zone any time cases or controversies turning on the
interpretation of this law are otherwise properly presented and otherwise
appropriate for judicial resolution. And this prerogative constitutes an
important limit on the power of the President to interpret treaties in the course
of performing or otherwise implementing U.S. treaty obligations.
Our argument unfolds as follows. In Parts I and II, we define the realm of
foreign relations law in which we consider substantial deference plainly
inappropriate- the executive-constraining zone. We identify several doctrinal
and institutional complications that arise if substantial, case-specific deference
is accorded in this zone. Our position is best understood as a broad defense of
the existing robust interpretive authority of Congress and the courts in this
zone of foreign relations law. In Part III, we identify several specific problems
with the Posner and Sunstein proposal. We first argue that Posner and
Sunstein offer no good reason to depart from the current longstanding
tradition of requiring Congress to authorize explicitly any action in violation of
international law that has the status of supreme federal law and conditions the
exercise of executive power. We also note that their proposal rests on an
unclear and inaccurate conception of foreign relations law-and that this
conception generates a host of boundary problems. In addition, we explain that
the Posner and Sunstein proposal would dramatically increase the power of the
President in ways that would be contrary to the nation's interests.
Furthermore, we suggest that their proposal would, ex ante, lead to far less
congressional regulation of the executive. Every time Congress authorized
force, for example, legislators would now have to fear that their authorization
would be viewed as a mandate to pursue any number of other activities that
violated international law. Finally, we point out that Posner and Sunstein's
legal claims would encourage courts to defer to self-interested positions taken
by the executive when those positions have not been established through
ordinary processes and interagency vetting-both necessary to cultivate the
11. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. 2002)); see,
e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-22 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
AUMF implicitly incorporates aspects of the international law of war); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV.
2047 (2005) (arguing that the AUMF should be interpreted as implicitly incorporating
several aspects of the international law of war).
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kind of accountable bureaucratic expertise that is a prerequisite to the deference
Posner and Sunstein envision. 2
I. OUR VIEW: MAKING, BREAKING, AND INTERPRETING LAW IN
THE "EXECUTIVE-CONSTRAINING ZONE"
We question whether there is a need to increase the deference accorded to
the executive in the foreign affairs context. We first note that the executive
enjoys substantial discretion in this context- and that courts typically play only
a modest role. The sharp edge of the Posner and Sunstein proposal is their
recommendation of substantial deference in an even broader set of
circumstances. We maintain that courts should, at a minimum, continue to
scrutinize executive interpretations of international law when that international
law has the status of supreme federal law; is made, at least in part, outside the
executive branch; and conditions the exercise of executive power.13 When
international law operates in that "executive-constraining zone," we believe
substantial deference by courts to the executive is inappropriate.
At present, courts are likely to second-guess foreign affairs determinations
of the executive in only a narrow range of circumstances.14 The courts defer to
foreign policy judgments of the executive when these judgments are relevant to
12. We therefore take issue with Posner and Sunstein's characterization of our argument as
being motivated by the "narrow frame" of the Bush Administration's post-9/1 policies.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1200. Indeed, when viewed against Curtis Bradley's
excellent article on the same subject, Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 679 (2000), the innovation in their piece is-as they themselves
partially admit-a post-9/11 perspective, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1177 n.14.
We believe that these very developments highlight the need for greater attention to
international law, and a greater awareness that short-term executives may set out to break
international law in ways that may harm the nation's long-term interests. The bulk of
Posner and Sunstein's non-9/11 analysis is simply not that controversial in light of Bradley's
excellent piece, and so we do not take issue with it here. But the rubber hits the road on their
claim that the executive should be able to break international law, including international
law codified in treaties ratified by a supermajority of the United States Senate.
13. We do not address whether even less deference is appropriate. Our claim is only that
substantial deference is inappropriate in a large class of foreign relations cases-and, as a
consequence, a large class of cases covered by Posner and Sunstein's proposal. For more
sweeping critiques of judicial deference in foreign affairs, see THOMAS M. FRANCK,
POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? (1992); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); and HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRAAFFAIR 134-49 (1990).
14. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 659 ("Since early in the nation's history, courts have been
reluctant to contradict the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations.").
1236
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:1230 2007
DISREGARDING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
the application of important separation of powers rules - such as the act of
state doctrine. s Many cases touching upon foreign affairs are dismissed under
the political question doctrine.16 This type of deference extends not only to
cases that turn on a nonjusticiable issue,17 but also to cases in which courts
accept the executive's determination of an issue as legally binding. I" In
addition, the executive enjoys substantial deference with respect to matters that
fall within its exclusive lawmaking authority.19 For example, the courts defer to
executive determinations about the immunity of foreign heads of state from
is. See, e.g., Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (deferring to the executive's policy determination that the act of state
doctrine should not apply). Courts have sharply limited the reach of this deference,
however. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)
(rejecting judicial deference to the executive's legal determination regarding the doctrine's
applicability); id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the Bernstein exception would
make the Court "a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick
some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others"'); id. (Powell, J., concurring) ("I
would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the
Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction.").
16. The broad applicability of the doctrine in the foreign relations context is often asserted in
unequivocal terms. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative -'the political' - Departments of the Government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision."). Although such sweeping statements accurately reflect the important
role of the doctrine in foreign relations, they inaccurately suggest that there is no
meaningful role for the judiciary in this domain. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12
(1962) ("There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign
relations are political questions .... Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." (citing Oetjen, 246 U.S. at
302)).
17. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(expressing the view that the President's constitutional authority to terminate a treaty was a
nonjusticiable political question).
i8. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 610-12 (1976)
(explaining the analytical distinction, and collecting cases). As Henkin has pointed out,
courts characterize some foreign relations issues as "political questions" not because courts
are somehow ill equipped to resolve the matter, but rather because "the President's decision
was within his [exclusive constitutional] authority and therefore law for the courts." Id. at
612; see also Bradley, supra note 12, at 66o (invoking the example of whether, after a change
of conditions, a foreign nation continues to remain a party to a treaty).
19. See generally LOuIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54-61
(2d ed. 1996) (explaining that courts recognize that the executive enjoys some independent
"legislative" authority in the foreign relations context and that courts defer to
determinations made pursuant to this authority).
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suit in the United States 20 and the recognition or nonrecognition of a foreign
state.21 The courts also defer to the executive's determination of a broad range
of what Curtis Bradley has called "international facts. '2 2 For example, courts
typically defer to executive determinations of the foreign affairs interests of the
United States.2 3 However these types of deference are characterized, the
important point for our purposes is that many foreign affairs issues are not
amenable to judicial resolution- and many determinations of the executive are
accepted by the courts as conclusive. In addition, some executive action in the
foreign affairs context is entitled to Chevron deference, as the doctrine is
currently conceived.24
Therefore, the only cases in which the Posner and Sunstein proposal would
do work are cases in which the issue presented: (1) is amenable to meaningful
and effective judicial resolution; (2) is not resolved by an instance of executive
lawmaking pursuant to its exclusive authority; (3) does not turn on any
"international fact" conclusively determined, or only capable of assessment, by
the executive; and (4) is not eligible for Chevron deference under current
doctrine.
The remaining population of cases includes many in which deference is, in
our view, wildly inappropriate. Most importantly, Posner and Sunstein
recommend substantial judicial deference to the executive's interpretation of
international law-indeed, they expressly favor expanding the international
lawbreaking authority of the executive. As they make plain: "[T]he executive
20. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Exparte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943). The role of the executive has been limited in this domain by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976. 28 U.S.C. § 133o, 1602-1611 (2000); see also
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 66o-o6; S. REP.
No. 94-131o, at 9 (1976) (noting that a "principal purpose" of the statute was "to transfer
the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring
litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process").
21. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-40 (1938). The recognition
power is incident to the President's constitutional power to appoint and receive
ambassadors. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2-3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (1987) ("[T]he President has exclusive
authority to recognize or not to recognize a foreign state or government .. .
22. Bradley, supra note 12, at 661-62.
23. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988) (deferring to the executive
branch's "[p]redictive judgment" in not issuing a security clearance); Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (deferring to the executive branch on whether there was an adequate
foreign policy justification for restricting travel to Cuba).
24:. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 663.
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branch should be given greater power than it currently has to decide whether
the United States will violate international law."2 We disagree. When
international law operates in an executive-constraining zone, courts should not
accord substantial deference to executive interpretations of it. With respect to
this category of international law, courts should scrutinize executive action
closely. Indeed, courts have and should continue to require explicit
congressional authorization for executive action inconsistent with this law.
Our claim, properly understood, is a modest one. Each of the characteristics
of the executive-constraining zone mentioned above reflects important
doctrinal and policy commitments in foreign relations law.26
Supreme federal law. The "supreme federal law" requirement excludes
treaties that are not self-executing and, for the purposes of our Article, excludes
customary international law. 7 International law that has the status of supreme
federal law is thus part of the law of the United States- meaning that this law
trumps inconsistent state law and prior inconsistent federal law, the President
has the constitutional obligation to "take Care" that this law is faithfully
executed, and this law falls within the substantive ambit of the "judicial Power"
of the United States." In fact, the Supreme Court, in an opinion penned by
Chief Justice Roberts, has recently made this clear:
25. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1177; see also id. at 1178 ("[C]omity-related ambiguities in
any grant of power to the President . . . should be settled by the executive, even if
international law is inconsistent with the executive's view.").
26. We do not offer any criticism in this piece of the Chevron doctrine as currently conceived.
Our point is that Chevron ought not be extended to include international law in the
"executive-constraining zone" not otherwise eligible for Chevron deference.
27. Whether customary international law enjoys the status of "supreme federal law" is a matter
of some controversy. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, i1o HARv. L.
REv. 81S (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law] (arguing
that customary international law is not federal law and must be incorporated by the political
branches before it may be applied as a rule of decision by federal courts); Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, il1 HARv. L. REv. 1824 (1998) (arguing that
customary international law is federal law subject to common law incorporation by federal
courts); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, ill HARv. L. REV. 2260 (1998) (replying to Koh). We do not attempt to
resolve this complex issue here. We exclude this body of law from our concept of the
executive-constraining zone for two reasons. First, its status in U.S. law is, as a formal
matter, in some doubt. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law,
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 12o HARv. L. REV. 869 (2007); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Second, customary international law raises several practical
and structural concerns that weaken the case against substantial deference to the executive.
See infra text accompanying notes 29, 49, 112.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3; id. art. III, § 1.
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Under our Constitution, "[t]he judicial Power of the United States" is
"vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." That "judicial
Power... extend[s] to ... Treaties." And, as Chief Justice Marshall
famously explained, that judicial power includes the duty "to say what
the law is." If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our
legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law "is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department," headed
by the "one supreme Court" established by the Constitution. [S]ee also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-379[] (2000) (opinion of
STEVENS, J.) ("At the core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts'
independent responsibility-independent from its coequal branches in
the Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority
of the several States - to interpret federal law"). It is against this
background that the United States ratified, and the Senate gave its
advice and consent to, the various agreements that govern referral of
Vienna Convention disputes to the ICJ.2 9
Chief Justice Roberts's claim further suggests that customary international
law rests on an altogether different footing, as it is not ratified by the Senate.
There are structural and practical problems with extending our claims about
deference to this other area, in which no United States government actor has
expressly made the law binding-and in which the law is made through no
constitutionally prescribed process. For that reason, we acknowledge that the
case for or against deference to interpretations of customary international law
rests on different arguments that are beyond the scope of our Article.
29. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (20o6) (Roberts, C.J.) (first, second, and
fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). Much of our argument concerns how and
why the robust participation of courts in foreign relations law, subject to the express
instructions of Congress, is constitutionally and practically crucial. The specific line of
analysis developed in this Part, however, suggests that there are also modest, but important,
limits on the constitutional capacity of Congress to assign interpretive authority to the
President. As described in the text, Article III assigns courts the constitutional prerogative to
interpret, within the context of "Cases" or "Controversies," the laws and treaties of the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. i. This line of reasoning calls into question the
constitutionality of section 6 of the Military Commissions Act, which purports to assign the
President authority to interpret for the United States some provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. Military Commissions Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(3), 20o6
U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 2600, 2632 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 note). That is, this
provision arguably intrudes on the constitutional authority of the courts if it purports to
designate the President as the final arbiter of the Conventions' meaning even in the context
of otherwise properly presented "Cases" or "Controversies."
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Consider the example of the Geneva Conventions."0 The text, structure,
and history of the Conventions strongly support the conclusion that they are
self-executing in the sense that they directly establish binding legal obligations.
The Conventions prescribe detailed rules defining the proper treatment of
wartime detainees. The purpose of these treaties is to establish minimum rules
for the treatment of persons subject to the authority of the enemy. For
example, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (GPW) provides the following rights: (I) the right to humane treatment
while in confinement (including important limitations on coercive
interrogation tactics);31 (2) due process rights if prisoners of war (POWs) are
subject to disciplinary or punitive sanctions;2 (3) the right to release and
repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities ;3' and (4) the right to
communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of) protective
agencies.3 4 The GPW also prohibits reprisals against POWs"s and precludes the
use of POWs as slave laborers.36 In addition, the treaties define, with some
precision, the categories of persons they protect.3 7 In short, the Conventions
assign bundles of rights to certain categories of war detainees.3
8
The ratification debates in the United States lend further support to the
conclusion that the treaties enjoy the status of self-executing supreme federal
law. President Truman transmitted the Conventions to the Senate on April 25,
30. GC, supra note 1o; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
31. GPW, supra note 30, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 147 (humane treatment); see
also id. art. 17, 6 U.S.T. at 3330, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148 (rules concerning interrogation); id. arts.
21-48, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-54, 75 U.N.T.S. at 152-72 (rules governing conditions of
confinement).
32. Id. arts. 99-1o8, 6 U.S.T. at 3392-3400, 75 U.N.T.S. at 21o-18.
33. Id. arts. 118-119, 6 U.S.T. at 3406-08, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
34. Id. arts. 8-11, 6 U.S.T. at 3324-28, 75 U.N.T.S. at 144-46.
35. Id. art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
36. Id. arts. 49-57, 6 U.S.T. at 3354-60, 75 U.N.T.S. at 172-78.
37. See, e.g., id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
38. The Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan v. Runisfeld that "the 1949 Geneva Conventions
were written 'first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve State interests."' 126
S. Ct. 2749, 2794 n.57 (2006) (citing OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 21 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans.,
1958)).
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1951, 39 the Senate gave its consent to ratification on July 6, 1955,40 and the
United States ratified the treaties on July 14, 1955. In the ratification process,
the treatymakers clearly expressed the view that only a few of the provisions
required implementing legislation to become operative as U.S. law.41 The
subsequent practice of the U.S. military also suggests that the executive branch
has understood the Conventions to have the status of supreme federal law.
Army Regulation 19o-8 establishes policies and procedures "for the
administration, treatment, employment, and compensation of enemy prisoners
of war (EPW), retained personnel (R.P), civilian internees (CI), and other
detainees (OD) in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces." 42 Notably, this
regulation cites the Geneva Conventions, rather than any federal statute, as the
legal basis for the military's authority to promulgate the regulation.43 The
regulation also states: "In the event of conflicts or discrepancies between this
regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions take precedence." 44 In short, the U.S. military has expressly stated
that the Geneva Conventions are directly binding on all U.S. military forces as
a matter of domestic law, even when they conflict with the military's own
regulations.
For these reasons, the Geneva Conventions have the status of supreme
federal law.45 The constitutional obligation of the President to observe, and the
constitutional prerogative of the judiciary to interpret, treaties like the Geneva
39. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR
VICTIMS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 84-9, at 3 (1955).
40. See 84 CONG. REC. 9958, 9972-73 (1955).
41. The Senate report enumerated only a handful of non-self-executing provisions. See, e.g., S.
ExEc. REP. No. 84-9, at 27 ("It should be emphasized, in any event, that the grave breaches
provisions cannot be regarded as self-executing ...."); id. at 25 (discussing Articles 53 and
54 of Geneva Convention I, which concern the use of the "Red Cross" symbol by private
parties, and noting that "[i]t is the position of the executive branch that the prohibition of
articles 53 and 54 is not intended to be self-executing"). The Senate report stated explicitly
"that very little in the way of new legislative enactments will be required to give effect to the
provisions contained in the four conventions." Id. at 30. The report then recommended a
few minor changes to federal statutes. See id. at 30-31.
42. Army Reg. 19o-8 § 1-i(a) (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffdes/ri9o_8.pdf.
43. Id. 1-1(b).
44. Id. 1-1(b)(4).
45. The Conventions have the status of supreme federal law irrespective of whether they create a
private right of action. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding
that California law was preempted by certain bilateral agreements between the United
States and European governments, despite the fact that none of the bilateral agreements
created a private right of action, on the ground that the agreements preempted California
law under the Supremacy Clause).
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Conventions strongly suggest that Chevron-style deference to the executive's
interpretation of this law is inappropriate. In this area, the executive is not
making law; it is enforcing the rules the Senate ratified in order to restrain the
executive branch in the first place.
Law made outside the executive. The condition that the law be made, at least
in part, outside the executive excludes "sole executive agreements"-
international agreements concluded by the executive with respect to some
matter within its lawmaking authority. Presumably, the executive retains
substantial capacity to interpret and even abandon executive-made law. Article
II treaties, however, are made with the "Advice and Consent" of the Senate.
6
That this law is made with the approval of the Senate strongly suggests that
the executive does not properly possess unfettered discretion in its
interpretation. This is not to say that courts accord no deference to executive
interpretations of self-executing treaties. Indeed, courts give "respect" and
"great weight" to the executive's interpretation of Article II treaties.47 This
"deference" is, however, limited and decidedly more modest than Chevron
deference-as evidenced by the Supreme Court's analysis of the Common
Article 3 issue in Hamdan.4' This condition also excludes from the executive-
constraining zone executive action interpreting, implementing, or even
violating customary international law. Again, in the context of customary
international law, the relevant executive action is often the only action taken by
one of the political branches -and thus the case for deference in this context is,
we concede, much stronger.
49
Contrast ratified treaties such as the Geneva Conventions with various
"sole executive agreements." A sole executive agreement is an international
agreement concluded by the President on the basis of his independent
constitutional authority, without legislative authorization. Between 1789 and
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
47. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) ("[r]espect");
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) ("great weight" (quoting Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982))); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
295 (1933) ("of weight"); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985)
("considerable deference"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) (1987) ("Courts . . . will give great weight to an
interpretation made by the Executive Branch.").
48. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796-97 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12. Note that the Posner and Sunstein proposal does not
distinguish between treaties and customary international law. It also fails to distinguish
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. This undifferentiated treatment of
international law is doctrinally suspect and produces several normative problems we identify
below. See infta text accompanying notes 109-114.
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1989, the United States concluded more than 12,ooo nontreaty international
agreements, including 1182 such agreements concluded before 1939, some of
which were sole executive agreements."0 Although these agreements supersede
inconsistent state law,' courts have consistently held that they do not
supersede inconsistent acts of Congress.2 There is good reason to assign the
executive broad, even minimally constrained, interpretive and lawbreaking
authority with respect to sole executive agreements given that this species of
law is made without the participation of Congress. And its status in the
hierarchy of federal law precludes any adverse effects on preexisting
congressional action.
Law must regulate the executive. The condition that the law must regulate the
executive excludes international law that is best understood as directed to
another branch. For instance, we do not address the propriety of deference in
the context of international law concerning the scope of national court
jurisdiction or international law requiring countries to consider certain factors
in national budgetary processes. This condition would also exclude
international law that pertains to matters within the exclusive authority of the
executive. The point is to limit our claim to international law properly
addressed to the regulation of executive action. With respect to this class of
cases, any practical advantages of judicial deference are substantially offset by
50. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14 (1993) [hereinafter CRS STUDY]. Due in part to definitional
problems in distinguishing between sole executive agreements and congressional-executive
agreements, it is unclear how many of these were sole executive agreements. However, it is
fair to assume that a substantial number were sole executive agreements.
51. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that sole executive
agreements with Germany, France, and Austria preempted a California statute); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that a sole executive agreement with Iran
preempted state law breach of contract claims); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
(holding that a sole executive agreement with Russia preempted New York common law
rules governing the relative priority of competing creditors); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937) (same).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding
that an "executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by Congress and
contravened provisions of a statute"); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021
(D. Colo. 1983) ("[E]xecutive agreements do not supersede prior inconsistent acts of
Congress because, unlike treaties, they are not the 'supreme Law of the Land."'); Seery v.
United States, 127 F. Supp. 6Ol, 606-07 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (rejecting the government's
contention that an executive agreement is equivalent to a treaty under the Supremacy
Clause). But see Etlimar Societe Anonyme of Casablanca v. United States, lo6 F. Supp. 191,
196 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (suggesting that an executive agreement might supersede an earlier act of
Congress).
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the costs of assigning robust interpretive authority to the very agency that is
regulated by the regime.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE STRENGTH (OR LACK THEREOF) OF
DEFERENCE CLAIMS
There are several important constraints on the strength of deference claims.
For example, there are two different sources from which the legitimacy of the
executive flows -democratic accountability and expertise. 3 Sometimes those
aspects are in tension with one another-with experts within the bureaucracy
decrying decisions as being made for political reasons. In these conflicts, it is
not obvious that deference to the (sometimes) politically accountable President
should trump an interpretation favored by the bureaucracy -at least when the
expert interpretation is backed by international law principles and a statute that
is to be read as consistent with international law. Accordingly, for reasons we
develop later in this Article, s deference claims are greatly weakened when they
are in tension with the views of the executive's own experts.
This disjunction provides an important point of contrast with Posner and
Sunstein. At points they frame the issue as merely whether "the executive's
interpretation [should] be entitled to respect.""s Put that way, there is nothing
particularly controversial about their analysis, as we cannot imagine anyone
saying that courts should not give "respect" to an executive interpretation. The
hard question, which Posner and Sunstein's lengthy doctrinal analysis
sometimes obscures, is whether courts should permit the President to violate
international law in the executive-constraining zone. Posner and Sunstein
think that they should, for reasons based on the doctrine and policy behind
Chevron deference. This theory, which they admit "has radical implications,"
would mean that, as they put it, "the executive branch should be given greater
power than it currently has to decide whether the United States will violate
international law."
' 6
Our view is different. We believe that courts have, over two centuries,
rejected invitations to provide strong deference because it risks concentrating
too much power in the executive branch. We do not believe that Chevron,
53. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (20o6) ("[T]he executive is the home of two
different sorts of legitimacy: political (democratic will) and bureaucratic (expertise).").
54. See infra Section III.E.
55. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1176.
56. Id. at 1177.
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either as doctrine or as analogy, provides much to justify Posner and Sunstein's
departure from the status quo. After all, Chevron is based on the
aforementioned twin rationales of democratic accountability and expertise.57
There are reasons why both are lacking in this unique setting.
With respect to political accountability, many key foreign policy decisions
are made in secret and only reach the public years later. When they do, the
executive is then able to say that the nation cannot reverse course without
damaging the nation's credibility. More important still, these decisions often
restrict only the liberty of foreigners -who cannot vote. To rely, as Posner and
Sunstein do, on political accountability to police adequately the treatment of
foreigners risks serious process failures and embraces a fiction of constraint
that is unlikely to matter in the real world.s8 For these reasons, the comparative
lack of political accountability in this foreign affairs context suggests that
Chevron may not be the appropriate lens through which to view the problem.
There is, however, the other Chevron rationale of expertise, which remains
a crucial part of the inquiry. As then-Judge Breyer wrote two years after
Chevron, "[C]ourts will defer more when the agency has special expertise that
it can bring to bear on the legal question." 9 Judicial inquiry under both the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 60 and Chevron tends to examine whether
the agency both had and used its expertise. This inquiry is explicit under the
APA and, despite being forced a bit into the background by Chevron, is now
becoming increasingly visible in recent decisions by the Supreme Court. As
57. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
191 (1998) ("[T]he Court [in Chevron] ultimately supported its deference principle with
two intertwined policy reasons- agency expertise and democratic accountability .... "). But
see Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 432 (2oo6) (asserting that Chevron deference is grounded
"primarily (but not exclusively) in notions of political accountability").
58. See Katyal, supra note 53, at 2341 & n.103, 2342 (questioning whether accountability provides
a convincing account in the foreign affairs context); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, iii YALE L.J. 1259, 1302-03 (2002)
(describing how the military commission exemption for U.S. citizens eviscerates political
accountability); cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[T]he democratic majority [must] accept for themselves and their loved
ones what they impose on you and me."); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 1o6,
112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow ... officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected.").
59. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 370
(1986).
6o. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
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part of this inquiry, courts often emphasize the agency's methods, which courts
have the institutional competence to monitor, as a proxy for the agency's
expertise.61
Under the APA, courts may set aside agency action if it is "arbitrary,




As part of this "hard-look," courts openly consider whether an agency's action
is "the product of reasoned decision making. ''63 Therefore, when agencies
rely solely on post hoc rationalizations for their actions, they curry little favor
with courts . 6
4
Chevron's partial grounding in expertise emphasized two related
observations: first, that the case involved a "regulatory scheme [that was]
technical and complex, [for which] the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion," and second, that "[j]udges are not experts in
the field."6 Indeed, Chevron's second step, which asks courts to evaluate
whether the agency has developed a permissible construction of the statute,6 6
is essentially an investigation into the methods of agency decision-making.
Courts and scholars alike have analogized this stage of review to the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard under the APA, with its emphasis on reasoned
a 6 ,analysis.
6
Despite its provenance as a pre-Chevron case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.68 is
frequently cited as an illustration of the principle that a lack of deliberative
procedures can condemn agency rulemaking under Chevron's Step Two.6 9 In
State Farm, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinded its
61. Administrative law is not the first field of law in which courts have relied on evaluation of
method as a proxy for the evaluation of substance. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993) (discussing the evaluation of methodology underlying
expert scientific testimony as a test of the acceptability of the testimony).
62. 5 U.S.C. 5 7o6(2)(A) (2000).
63. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52
(1983).
64. See id. at So.
6S. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
66. Id. at 843.
67. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997); Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling
Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 n.26 (2004).
68. 463 U.S. 29.
69. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (enjoining
enforcement of a rule because the agency failed to provide adequate reasons).
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requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with passive restraints. The
Court found severe flaws in the agency's reasoning and cost-benefit analysis -
underscoring how a failure to demonstrate "reasoned analysis," informed by
proper methods, overcomes the presumption of deference.7"
Formal process and expertise may also prove critical in determining which
cases fall outside of Chevron deference altogether. United States v. Mead
Corp., 71 for example, established that rules made pursuant to delegated
powers are entitled to comprehensive deference under Chevron but that
interpretations issued outside that scope receive more skepticism. 72 To
determine whether Congress has delegated power, Mead instructed the
reviewing court to look to the formality of the adjudication process and to
whether notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures were created and
observed.73 And quite recently, Gonzales v. Oregon74 rejected the Attorney
General's interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act to preclude doctors
from prescribing drugs for use in assisted suicide.7 The Court's reasoning
was explicitly grounded on the relative lack of expertise possessed by the
Attorney General. The Court pointedly remarked, "The structure of the
[statute], then, conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments to an
Executive official who lacks medical expertise.
76
This tour of the Chevron case law reveals the importance of expertise in
modern deference analysis. In the foreign affairs realm, we do not doubt that
there are times when the President may make a decision after heeding the
expertise of the relevant agencies. But when the President fails to follow those
processes, the case for deference -whether Chevron-style or some other
70. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-57.
71. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
72. See id. at 227-31 (discussing deference under Skidmore v. Sift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),
among other cases).
73. See id. at 230 ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force."). For similar reasons, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576 (2000), earlier held that an interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act contained in
an agency opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference. The agency's interpretation
was not, the Court pointed out, the result of a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
period and therefore lacked the force of law. Id. at 587.
74. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
75- Id. at 925.
76. Id. at 921. Deference would be appropriate only if the administrative action "reflected the
considerable experience and expertise the (agency] had acquired over time with respect to
the complexities of the [statute]." Id. at 915.
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variant-is much weaker. In those settings, the action appears self-interested
instead of being the product of an expert agency process.
For these reasons, many of the assumptions underlying Chevron deference
do not appear to translate well in the executive-constraining zone. These
differences should lead one to question whether Chevron is a proper framework
for a project of deference in the modern foreign affairs realm, or whether its
invocation obscures more than it illuminates. To be sure, faith in Chevron has
risen considerably both in the courts and in the academy in recent years, and so
it is unsurprising that scholars would want to ride the wave of Chevron's
success. But trying to extend deference beyond its traditional contours might
ultimately hurt the project of Chevron deference. If courts decided to treat the
war on terror cases, for example, through the lens of Chevron, they might need
to water down the degree of deference due to the lack of political accountability
and expertise that might be involved. And the second-guessing, under Chevron,
in those areas might ultimately bleed over to the domestic context.
Instead, it might be more productive to examine the deference question on
its own terms, without invoking Chevron. Doing so might usefully focus
questions on whether the decisions at issue fall within the executive-
constraining zone, as well as whether political accountability and expertise are
involved to a degree necessary to award deference.
The bottom line is that courts have scrutinized and should scrutinize
executive interpretations of international law in the executive-constraining
zone-when claims arising under such law are otherwise properly presented.
The balance of the Article outlines several reasons why deference exceeding
these bounds is problematic.
III. THE CASE AGAINST POSNER AND SUNSTEIN'S PROPOSAL TO
PROVIDE DEFERENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE-CONSTRAINING ZONE
A. Evaluating the Affirmative Case for Deference
In essence, we disagree with the premise that a change in existing law that
requires awarding additional deference to the President in foreign affairs is
warranted. Posner and Sunstein build their case for change not on legal
precedent (with which they disagree), or on the text of the Constitution (which
they concede is ambiguous) 77 but rather on policy reasons:
77. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1202.
1249
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Courts say that the nation must speak in "one voice" in its foreign
policy; the executive can do this, while Congress and the courts cannot.
They say that the executive has expertise and flexibility, can keep
secrets, can efficiently monitor developments, and can act quickly and
decisively; the other branches cannot. As emphasized in Chevron, the
executive, unlike the judiciary, is politically accountable as well as
uniquely knowledgeable ....
This line of reasoning misses the mark in several important respects and, in
our view, offers no good reason to augment the deference already accorded
executive interpretations of international law. First, there is no reason to
conclude that the current scope of judicial deference unacceptably impedes the
ability of the President to respond to a crisis. Second, wholly adequate checking
mechanisms limit the power of the courts to foist unwelcome interpretations of
international law on the political branches. Consider a few examples. The
political branches, in the course of negotiating, ratifying, performing, and
otherwise implementing U.S. treaty obligations, undertake a series of actions
that signal, and at times establish, the U.S. interpretation of specific treaty
terms. When the United States has authoritatively and discernibly embraced an
interpretation of its treaty obligations, courts give effect to this interpretation.79
The President might also issue formal interpretations of U.S. treaty obligations
through the proper exercise of his substantial lawmaking (or delegated
rulemaking) 8o authority.8' In addition, the President has the constitutional
78. Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. For example, the United States often formally articulates various "understandings" and
"declarations" when ratifying a treaty. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. 8o6o, 8070 (1992)
(concerning the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). See
generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (detailing the U.S. treatymaking process and the role
of proposed conditions in the ratification of treaties). Courts give effect to such formal
interpretive acts. See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 142 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[F]or
purposes of domestic law, the understanding proposed by the President and adopted by the
Senate in its resolution of ratification are the binding standard to be applied in domestic
law.").
go. Such lawmaking or rulemaking would often qualify for Chevron deference under existing
doctrine.
81. For example, the executive promulgated Army Regulation 19o-8 as an implementation of
international law on the treatment of wartime detainees. The Regulation constituted an
authoritative statement on the U.S. interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
customary law of war. The Regulation provides an interpretation of when captured
combatants are entitled to POW status, how they might be stripped of that status, and the
treatment regime applicable to any person deprived of any rights-bearing status under the
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authority to execute the laws-this power almost certainly includes the
authority to terminate, suspend, or withdraw from treaties in accordance with
international law. Congress has the constitutional authority to abrogate, in
whole or in part, U.S. treaty obligations via an ordinary statute-a lawmaking
process that, of course, includes the President. Augmenting the law-
interpreting (and lawbreaking) power of the President drastically diminishes
the role of courts - thereby effectively depriving international law in the
executive-constraining zone of its capacity to constrain meaningfully and,
Conventions. Army Reg. 19o-8 (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/
r19o_8.pdf.
Several of the litigation positions advanced by the administration in cases related to the
war on terror contradict the interpretations provided in the Regulation. Consider two
examples: (1) whether some persons fall outside the scope of the Conventions altogether;
and (2) when a hearing is required to deprive a detainee of POW status. Under the
Conventions, all persons captured in time of armed conflict are entitled to a rights-bearing
status. See, e.g., UHLER ET AL., supra note 38, at 51 ("[It is a] general principle which is
embodied in all four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Every person in enemy hands must have
some status under international law .... There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy
hands can be outside the law."); Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 367 (2004) (providing a sustained defense of this interpretation). Army
Regulation 19o-8 itself arguably embraces this view. Army Reg. 19o-8 § 1-6(e)(io)
(requiring that all captured persons be classified as prisoners of war or civilians); id. § 1-5
(providing that all prisoners must be treated humanely and fairly under Geneva law); see,
e.g., Brief for Respondents at 37-42, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184), available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/HamdanSGmeritsbrief.pdf (arguing
that the Geneva Conventions do not protect terrorist groups). In addition, the GPW
requires hearings to resolve any doubt about whether a detainee is entitled to POW status.
Article 5 of the GPW provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.
GPW, supra note 30, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 74 U.N.T.S. at 142. Army Regulation 19o-8
provides that a qualifying "doubt" exists whenever the detainee asserts POW status. Army
Reg. 19o-8, § 1-6(b). For analysis of this provision, see Joseph Blocher, Comment,
Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667
(2006).
The Bush Administration has, to the contrary, repeatedly asserted that the GPW status
of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees is beyond doubt- irrespective of whether any detainee
has asserted POW status. E.g., Brief for Respondents, supra, at 38 ("The President has
determined that the Geneva Convention does not 'apply to our conflict with al Oaeda .... '
The President further determined that, 'because (the Convention] does not apply to our
conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.' The
President's determination represents a classic exercise of his war powers and his authority
over foreign affairs more generally ... and is binding on the courts." (citations omitted)).
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consequently, its status as enforceable "law." Such an expansion of the
President's authority also subverts the institutional capacity (and hence, the
political will) of Congress to regulate the executive in these domains. These
themes merit some elaboration.
Exigency does not compel a rejection of the status quo. Indeed, Posner and
Sunstein's article is not concerned with whether the President can put boots on
the ground without a statute; rather, it is addressed to litigation and what
courts should do, typically years after the fact. Speed is often irrelevant.82 So,
too, is accountability. The legislature is just as accountable as the executive.
And textually, of course, Congress has a strong role to play in the incorporation
of international law into the domestic sphere, from its Article I, Section 8
powers to "declare War," to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water," and to "punish ...Offences against the Law of Nations," to the
Senate's Article II, Section 2 power to ratify treaties.8 3
In one sense, then, our disagreement centers around default rules. Posner
and Sunstein acknowledge that Congress can specify an antidelegation/
antideference principle.84 Yet oddly, their whole article frames the relevant
issue as the competence of the executive branch versus that of the judiciary. But
given the fact that this tussle between the executive and the judiciary will
always play out within a matrix set by the legislature, it is not quite appropriate
to compare the foreign policy expertise of the executive branch with that of the
courts.8 s After all, Congress could specify a prodelegation/prodeference policy
82. Of course, a robust deference regime in this area might lead ex ante to faster executive
decision-making, as the President would then have less to fear from subsequent judicial
review. But it is not obvious that such speedy decision-making is a laudable policy objective,
particularly when courts already provide great latitude to presidents and avoid enjoining
their conduct in the midst of crises. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 58, at 1272-73
(describing this view). In any event, the Senate could always build additional leeway into
the treaties it ratifies to provide such assurances to the executive if it believed these
assurances appropriate. And it is exceptionally doubtful that current law would provide any
authority whatsoever for federal courts to enjoin the placement of troops in the midst of
wartime.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. cl. lo; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
84. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1194-96.
85. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this point, emphasizing that foreign affairs
decisions are the province of two branches, not one. E.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("[T]he very nature of executive decisions as
to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.");
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative -'the
political'-Departments of the Government. (emphasis added)).
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most of the time as well. (In fact, it has repeatedly done so.8 6) The more
precise question is which entity is better suited to interpret a legislative act of
some ambiguity, when international law principles would yield an answer that
restrains the executive branch.
Once the question is properly framed, much of Posner and Sunstein's
challenge to the status quo falls out. Most crucially, they fail to account for a
dynamic statutory process -through which mistakes (if any) made by courts in
the area can be corrected by the legislature. Such legislative corrections can take
place in both the statutory and the treaty realm. If a court reads a statute in light
of international law principles and Congress disagrees with those principles, it
can rewrite the statute. And if a court reads a treaty to constrain the executive in a
way Congress does not like, it can trump the treaty, in whole or in part, with a
statute under the "last-in-time" rule.s7 More fundamentally, the Senate can
define the role of courts up front - during the ratification process - by attaching
to the instrument of ratification specific reservations, declarations, or
understandings concerning the judicial enforceability of the treaty.88
With a stylized account that criticizes the relative competence of the
judiciary, Posner and Sunstein make it appear that a judicial decision in foreign
affairs is the last word. But that set of events would rarely, if ever, unfold in
this three-player game. If the courts err in a way that fails to give the executive
enough power, Congress will correct them. Surely national security is not an
area rife with process failures. In that sense, current law works better than the
Posner and Sunstein proposal because it forces democratic deliberation before
international law is violated.
For this reason, it obscures more than it illuminates to say that "the courts,
and not the executive, might turn out to be the fox." 8' Such language assumes
86. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1801-1991 (2000), amended by Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 21O1-2495 (2000); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000); Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-6, 7-
39, 41-44 (2000).
87. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, i8 n.34 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("By the Constitution a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation.... [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other ......
(alteration in original) (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888))); see also
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
88. Some have argued that the Constitution bars Congress from either imposing on the courts
an interpretation of a treaty post-ratification or recharacterizing a treaty as non-self-
executing post-ratification. See Carlos M. Vizquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva
Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, lOl AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (2007).
89. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1212. They make similar claims elsewhere. E.g., id. at 1216
("Perhaps the President is wrong. Are federal judges more likely to be right?").
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a stagnant legislative process, so that the choice is "court" versus "executive,"
when the real choice is really "court + Congress." That is to say, if the courts
grab power in a way that undermines the executive, Congress can correct them.
The relevant calculus turns on which type of judicial error is more likely to be
resolved, one in which the court wrongly sides with the President (in which
case Congress would have to surmount the veto) or one in which the court
wrongly sides against the President (in which case the veto would be unlikely
to be a barrier to corrective legislation).
Recall that Posner and Sunstein are not addressing their argument to
constitutional holdings by courts, but statutory ones that are the subject of
Chevron deference. There is much to criticize when courts declare government
practices unconstitutional in the realm of foreign affairs, as those practices
cannot then be resuscitated by the legislature absent a constitutional
amendment. But when a court's holding centers on a statutory interpretation,
the dynamic legislative process ensures that the judiciary will not have the last
word.
Indeed, in this statutory area, the risks of judicial error are asymmetric-
that is, judicial decisions that side with the President are far less likely to be the
subject of legislative correction than those that side against him. While
contemporary case law and theory have not taken the point into account, we
believe that they provide a powerful reason to reject Posner and Sunstein's
proposal. Our claim centers on the President's veto power and how the
structure of the Constitution imposes serious hurdles when Congress tries to
modify existing statutes to restrict presidential power.
Suppose that, for example, the President asserts that the Detainee
Treatment Act,90 sponsored by Senator John McCain and others to prohibit
the torture of detainees, does not forbid a particular practice, such as
waterboarding. A group of plaintiffs, in contrast, argue that standard principles
of international law and treaties ratified by the Senate forbid waterboarding,
and that these principles require reading the statute to forbid the practice. Now
imagine that the matter goes to the Supreme Court. The risks from judicial
error are not equivalent. If the Court sides with the plaintiffs, the legislature
can-presumably with presidential encouragement- modify the statute to
permit waterboarding, provided that a bare majority of Congress agrees. The
go. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Star. 2739 (codified at lo U.S.C.A. § 8oi note, 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 20oodd to 20oodd-1 (West Supp. 20o6)). Section
6(b)(1) of the Military Commissions Act of 2o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(120 Stat.) 26oo, 2633 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 2441), amends some provisions of the
War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. S 2441 (2000), that apply to interrogation of wartime
detainees, and these amendments present the same problems.
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prospect of legislative revision explains why many of the criticisms of the
Supreme Court's involvement in the war on terror thus far are entirely
overblown.9'
Now take the other possibility -that the Court sides with the President. In
such a case, it is virtually impossible to alter the decision. That would be so
even if everyone knew that the legislative intent at the time of the Act was to
forbid waterboarding. Even if, after that Court decision, Senator McCain
persuaded every one of his colleagues in the Senate to reverse the Court's
interpretation of the Detainee Treatment Act and to modify the Act to prohibit
waterboarding, the Senator would also have to persuade a supermajority in the
House of Representatives. After all, the President would be able to veto the
legislation, thus upping the requisite number of votes necessary from a bare
majority to two-thirds. And his veto power functions ex ante as a disincentive
even to begin the legislative reform process, as Senators are likely to spend
their resources and time on projects that are likely to pass.92
So what Posner and Sunstein seek is not a simple default rule, but one with
a built-in ratchet in favor of presidential power. The President can take, under
the guise of an ambiguous legislative act, an interpretation that gives him
striking new powers, have that interpretation receive deference from the
courts, and then lock the interpretation into place for the long term by
brandishing his veto power. For authors who assert structural principles as
91. One might posit the possibility that the President doesn't want to employ such practices and
that Congress wants him to do so. Suppose, for example, that the Court found
waterboarding not authorized under the AUMF, and that Congress passed a bill to permit
the President to engage in it. In that case, the veto could conceivably be used to prevent such
legislation. The specter of such a veto might lead some to think that the risk of an erroneous
Court decision is symmetric-that a statutory interpretation that says the President can
engage in the practice is just as much of a problem, veto-wise, as one that says that he
cannot. However, the President's "take Care" and "Commander in Chief" powers suggest
otherwise. In such a circumstance, waterboarding would not be employed by the United
States regardless of what Congress authorized. Congress cannot require the President to
waterboard, so even if it authorized the practice, it would not be employed by a reluctant
President.
92. There are other ways to deal with this problem, such as building sunset clauses into
legislation at the outset. Court interpretations that gave the President additional powers
would then retire their force once the statute lapsed (but of course the President would still
wield that greater power until the lapse occurred). Another option might be to sunset the
judicial interpretation of the statute - so that the judicial opinion itself would lose its force as
binding precedent after a specified number of years or a specified event. See Neal Katyal,
Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237 (2004) (proposing this idea for
national security cases). It might also be possible to envision rules that permit courts to
impose sunsets on statutes, even those that they uphold, to level the playing field.
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their touchstone, Posner and Sunstein's omission of the veto is striking and
provides a lopsided view of what would happen under their proposal.
One common objection to our line of thinking is that the President must
enjoy substantial discretion to respond to the sort of crises that might arise in
the foreign relations realm.93 This is certainly an important point, but it should
not be overstated. No serious person contends that the President's powers in
an emergency are the same as in a nonemergency. The question Posner and
Sunstein are addressing, we take it, is simply how courts should view
presidential decisions (typically, years later). For example, if a court received a
temporary restraining order request in the midst of a true emergency when
Congress could not plausibly respond, of course deference to the President
would be appropriate unless the claims being made by the executive were
thoroughly outlandish. The rest of the time-the more than 99.9%-the
President's ability to respond in an emergency is beside the point. As long as
courts are not enjoining executive action (an exceptionally rare event), the
President should be able to take the action he deems necessary in a crisis and
face the consequences in the courts later. That approach permits the President
to act quickly but does not bestow on him a blank check to disregard law in the
executive-constraining zone.
After all, much of the law in question is expressly designed to condition the
exercise of executive power in times of national crisis. For example,
international humanitarian law regulates the treatment of captured enemy
fighters and civilians in times of war.94 The Uniform Code of Military Justice
regulates the administration of military courts- a matter that routinely, if not
always, implicates national security-and it does so even during wartime.9
The War Crimes Act of 1996 criminalizes violations of various treaty
provisions that are only applicable in times of war.96 When the object of the
law in question is to regulate the government's response to national security
challenges, the bare fact of a crisis does not provide a convincing rationale for
greater deference. The rationale instead has to center on the raw ability of
Congress to act. When Congress can act, and can respond to erroneous court
decisions that restrict the President's power, the case for deference is not
significantly enhanced by pointing to a "crisis."
93. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2007) (arguing
that courts should defer to the executive during emergencies).
94. See GPW, supra note 30, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
95. See lo U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by Military Commissions Act of 20o6 § 6(b)(i), Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 20o6 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 2600, 2632.
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Finally, Posner and Sunstein buttress their case for deference by pointing
out that "Congress has not objected to the traditional doctrines of executive
deference, and until it does so, the constitutional problems seem more
theoretical than real."97 There are two problems with this assertion. First,
Posner and Sunstein themselves are criticizing the case law for incorporating
these foreign relations canons, so it is not clear what Congress would be
objecting to at present. Second, it is a mistake to view congressional silence as
tacit approval, particularly in the modern context. Legislative silence in the past
few years may be a reflection of party loyalty, not true policy preference. That
is particularly so when the President wields the veto power, which means that
any legislative rebuke to the President would require a two-thirds
supermajority-a virtual impossibility in today's political climate.
B. Boundary Problems
The Posner and Sunstein proposal is predicated on an underdeveloped and
descriptively flawed notion of "foreign relations law." The authors do not
define with any precision the category of cases to which their proposal applies.
Given the broad scope of judicial deference contemplated, it is crucial that its
substantive purview be defined more clearly. At points, they suggest that
deference is appropriate in all cases involving a limited number of
"international relations doctrines."98 Their proposal, however, presumably
does not apply only to cases involving the routine application of these
"international relations doctrines," as they arise only in a very limited number
of cases, and in any event, courts typically do accord the executive substantial
deference in these contexts. 99 At other points, it is clear that Posner and
Sunstein recommend judicial deference to executive interpretations of any law
pertaining to foreign relations -irrespective of whether the instant action
involves an application of one of these doctrines.' And at still other points,
they seem to suggest that courts should defer to the executive's views in any
97. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1207.
98. See, e.g., id. at 1178-82 (identifying specific international relations doctrines employed by the
federal courts).
99. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 659-63 (collecting examples of judicial deference to the
executive in several of these contexts).
loo. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1198 (arguing that what is needed is a theory of
deference when the executive advances an interpretation of a statute that has "foreign
relations implications").
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case implicating foreign relations, irrespective of whether the specific law
applied is directed, as a general matter, to foreign affairs." 1
Several well-known developments have radically increased the number of
cases that directly implicate foreign relations: the explosion of international
lawmaking, economic globalization, transnational flows of people, and
transborder information flows occasioned by the transformation of
communications technology.' °2 These developments have also rendered foreign
elements increasingly common in U.S. litigation-in the form of foreign
parties, questions of foreign or international law, or some foreign conduct
relevant to the litigation.
Such boundary problems play out along several dimensions. In one sense,
the breadth of any foreign relations "effects" test is problematic. One problem
is that deference triggered by foreign relations "effects" arguably applies to any
case containing a foreign relations component-and arguably extends to any
legal question that arises in such cases irrespective of whether the question is
itself one of foreign relations. Consider a stylized example: an ordinary federal
criminal prosecution of a foreign national may affect foreign relations, and the
executive might well advance a broad interpretation of the conduct proscribed
by the relevant statute as part of its policy to pressure the defendant's home
state on an unrelated diplomatic matter. Also consider two less stylized
examples. An ordinary criminal prosecution under federal antiterrorism
conspiracy statutes may affect foreign relations even if the conduct in question
occurred in the United States -and the executive might well advance a broad
interpretation of the statute in service of the war on terror. And a civil action
that turns on the interpretation of statutes regulating domestic wiretapping
may affect foreign relations if the challenged surveillance is justified by
reference to a broader surveillance program that is, at least in part, directed
abroad.1 °3 Of course, we could suggest many other examples. The important
point is that a case-based foreign effects test triggers deference in a vast,
potentially unacceptable, range of circumstances.
Moreover, the boundary problems persist even if the Posner and Sunstein
proposal is limited to laws with a foreign relations component. One problem is
that many cases not involving any meaningful transnational element might
iol. Id. (applying the argument in the context of litigation that "affects foreign sovereigns").
102. In other contexts, courts and commentators reference these developments as evidence that
foreign relations "effects" tests are unworkably broad. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 316-21 (1994); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary
International Law, supra note 27, at 860-71; Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1410-25 (1999).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000).
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turn on the interpretation of statutes that peg the meaning of some important
terms to treaties or customary international law. Civil or criminal proceedings
alleging "torture" proceed under statutory provisions that define torture, in
part, by reference to treaty law.1 °4 Such laws arguably affect foreign relations
even when applied in an otherwise domestic action-say a suit between U.S.
citizens arising out of conduct committed in the United States. The Posner and
Sunstein proposal arguably prescribes deference to executive interpretation of
these provisions even when the specific application of the rule does not involve
a foreign component. Another problem is that some statutes incorporate a
foreign component into their enforcement scheme. For example, Congress at
times makes clear that some provisions of U.S. law apply extraterritorially.
Two such statutory schemes are the federal antiracketeering and antiterrorism
laws. 0 s Any case that turns on the interpretation of such a law arguably affects
foreign relations under a law-based test - irrespective of whether the instant
application of this law includes any (other) foreign component- because the
law in question is one that also applies outside the territory of the United
States.
The fundamental question is not whether Posner and Sunstein's proposal
extends to such cases, but why it does not (or why it does). The trouble is that
their policy argument proves too much. Recall that their policy rationale is
grounded in the institutional advantages of the executive over courts. The
identified institutional advantages strongly suggest that deference is
appropriate whenever the application or interpretation of law in a foreign
relations context turns on questions of prediction and value. And, as Posner
and Sunstein acknowledge, in a concrete case the application or interpretation
of laws governing foreign affairs almost always focuses on prediction and value
because determinations must be made about whether the foreign relations
component justifies treating the case like an ordinary "domestic" one.
Even if the class of laws and cases directly implicating foreign relations
were narrow and clearly discernable (it is neither), the proposal seems to
contemplate, and the logic of the argument supports, an exceptionally broad
field of application. , 6 Their normative claims are built upon the institutional
strengths of the executive in the foreign relations context- strengths that are
apparently relevant in any case touching upon foreign relations. And their
descriptive theory of the "international relations doctrines" suggests that
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234oA (2000).
1o5. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000) (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 233 2b (2000) (terrorism).
106. For the purposes of our affirmative argument, it is important to note that, at a minimum,
their proposal would recommend deference in all cases involving the interpretation and
application of international law.
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predictive and policy judgments pervade even routine judicial review of cases
that involve foreign relations. In short, they maintain that foreign relations
cases necessarily require courts to make the kind of predictive and policy
judgments best left to the executive. Their proposal, then, seemingly
recommends a dramatic increase in the lawmaking, law-interpreting, and even
lawbreaking authority of the executive because it advocates not only an increase
in the scope of deference accorded to the executive, but also an expansion of the
circumstances in which deference of any sort is appropriate.
Much of what Posner and Sunstein do say about this legal domain is
descriptively suspect. Their description of the distinctiveness of the foreign
relations field implies that it is only thinly legalized- governed largely by
diplomacy, politics, and ad hoc-ism-and, even when legalized, is unlike or
inferior to ordinary domestic law. The fact is, though, that many aspects of
foreign relations are governed by robust bodies of international law.' °7 This
law is often embodied in treaties and, when self-executing and ratified by the
United States, forms part of the law of the United States. These treaties are
also often expressly incorporated into U.S. statutes, regulations, and judge-
made law. For example, international humanitarian law, the interpretation of
which was at the heart of both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld1°8 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
is embodied in several important treaties (including, most importantly, the
Geneva Conventions) to which the United States is a party -and which were
ratified by the United States Senate. These treaties are unquestionably self-
executing (irrespective of whether they are directly enforceable in courts), and
they have been incorporated into the UCMJ, federal criminal law, and myriad
longstanding military regulations. The foreign is not easily distinguished from
the domestic -and international law is not easily distinguished from domestic
law.
These boundary problems are compounded by the fact that Posner and
Sunstein adopt an undifferentiated view of foreign relations law. Specifically,
they fail to distinguish between three important categories of "international"
law: self-executing treaties, non-self-executing treaties, and customary
international law. The failure to do so is doctrinally and normatively suspect.
One problem is that the three varieties of international law do not have the
same status under U.S. law-and the President's constitutional obligation to
comply with them varies accordingly. Courts have long recognized the
distinction between self-executing treaties, which have the status of "supreme
107. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG.
385, 386 (2000).
108. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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Law of the Land,"1 °9 and non-self-executing treaties, which do not."' The
President, therefore, presumably has a constitutional obligation to "take Care"
that self-executing treaties be "faithfully executed.' '.. The President has no
such obligation with respect to non-self-executing treaties. The status of
customary international law is less certain-though there is good reason to
conclude that it might not have the status of self-executing federal law. "2
Another problem is that the three varieties of international law emerge
from importantly different lawmaking processes. Both self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties are made via explicit action by the political branches.
Nevertheless, the assumptions of the Senate and President vary importantly
depending on whether the treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing.
Because the touchstone of the self-executing/non-self-executing inquiry is
whether the parties intended the treaty to create binding legal obligations of its
own force, non-self-executing treaties do not manifest an intention by the
political branches to create binding domestic law. These precatory international
agreements, whatever their virtues in promoting international cooperation,
often are not the product of an intentional lawmaking process. Even more
problematic in this respect is customary international law. This law emerges
from the general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of
legal obligation." 3 As a consequence, the political branches of the United States
play no well-defined role in the lawmaking process. The important point for
our purposes is that the case for deference to the executive's interpretation of
some international law is stronger if that law lacks an exalted status in U.S. law
or if it is the product of questionable institutional pedigree. Conversely, the
case for deference is weakest when the law in question has the status of
supreme federal law and is the product of rigorous lawmaking procedures.
A third problem is that the very distinction between these varieties of
international law, and its importance, make clear one final boundary concern.
The difficulty is that the characterization of a treaty as self-executing or non-
self-executing (or perhaps the characterization of a proposition as a rule of
customary international law) is itself arguably a question of foreign relations
log. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 2 ("[A]11 Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land....").
11o. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829). See generally Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995) (explaining this distinction and its implications).
Ill. U.S. CONST. art. 11, S 3.
112. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 27.
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
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law. As evidenced by the Bush Administration's submissions in the Hamdan
litigation, the executive often rebuts treaty-based claims with the argument
that the treaty in question is non-self-executing.114 Under the Posner and
Sunstein approach, the executive would acquire substantial authority to imbue
an enactment with the status of supreme federal law (or deprive it of that
status). The executive would also arguably acquire the authority to characterize
a legal issue as a "foreign relations" question by finding that the question turns
on the interpretation or application of customary international law.
In short, the Posner and Sunstein proposal is founded upon an
underspecified, descriptively suspect "foreign relations" trigger.
C. Excessive Concentration of Power in the Executive
We are also induced to reject Posner and Sunstein's proposal to depart
from existing antideference law because it risks concentrating too much power
in the executive. We have already said much about why we think substantial
deference to the executive in some contexts presents serious doctrinal and
institutional problems -and we did so in the course of defending the limited
deference accorded executive interpretations of some international law under
the status quo."' There, we were principally concerned with defending our
proposal against claims that a lack of deference would: (i) decrease the
government's capacity to respond to exigent circumstances of the sort that
pervade foreign relations; and (2) weaken important accountability
mechanisms in foreign relations law. Our posture was largely defensive. In this
Section, we supplement that discussion by identifying some of the normatively
suspect ways in which the concentration of foreign relations power in the
executive would distort U.S. foreign policymaking and foreign relations
lawmaking. Consider several institutional features of the executive.
Presidents are nearsighted in a way that other government actors are not,
particularly the judiciary, which tends to be farsighted. The difference in
outlook is a direct result of the Constitution's text and structure, which gives
the former four-year terms and the latter life tenure."16 Treaties and
international law are in part designed to restrain short-term executives from
acting in ways that are against a nation's long-term interests. To engineer a
way around this problem, Posner and Sunstein pick up the mantle of
"executive flexibility." But this flexibility is only one of several values protected
114. E.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 81, at 30-34.
11s. See supra Parts I-II.
116. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. i, with id. art. III, § i.
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by our structure of government. The Constitution's chief value lies in its
division of powers among the branches."1 7 This division is skewed considerably
when presidents are given the type of deference Posner and Sunstein seek. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this principle, from Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains, ' "" to Justice Story's claim that "when the
legislative authority ... has declared war in its most unlimited manner, the
executive... cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among
civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings
which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims. ' 19
Consider, for example, the bolt in popularity that could ensue if a President
decided to interpret the Geneva Conventions so that they would not protect a
huge class of individuals in a particular conflict. The President could claim that
the dramatic new threat required a change in procedures, and he might even
have a plausible case that the nation's security would be enhanced by the shift.
The problem is that, over the long term, such carve-outs and creative
interpretations of the Conventions could come back to harm America's national
security. Our troops, when captured, would face the same types of reasoning
by foreign leaders, who would carve U.S. troops out from protection under the
same instruments.
This is a familiar problem in government, as current leaders have structural
incentives to maximize the short term at the expense of future security. After
all, that is why the deficit is currently $423 billion. 2° Treaties can be seen as
commitment strategies on the part of political leaders to bind themselves in
advance to a course of action that will have long-term payoffs.' As Justice
Kennedy recently put it, "Respect for laws derived from the customary
operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of
117. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine
of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.").
11. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 427 (1913)
(interpreting an executive order during the Spanish-American War so that it would be
"consistent with the principles of international law").
119. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting). The
majority did not disagree. See id. at 125-28 (majority opinion).
izo. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S 2007 BUDGET 4 (2oo7),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pdf/overview-o7.pdf.
121. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 24-28 (2d ed. 198o); T.C. Schelling,
Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 290 (1978).
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stability in time of crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on
standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of the moment."'2
Treaties are part of this system of time-tested standards, and this feature
makes the wisdom of their judicial interpretation manifest. Unlike the political
branches, which labor under short-term incentives, particularly in times of
crisis, the judiciary is the only branch that harbors a long-term perspective.
The structural protections of Article III ensure that judges can imbue their
decisions with a sensibility not derived from maximizing short-term
advantage. As one of us has previously argued, "[A] s the only federal officials
with life tenure and guaranteed salary, federal judges have structural
advantages that enable them to stand above the political fray and provide other
officials with a detached, perhaps unpopular, perspective." 3  These
institutional characteristics of federal judges cannot be easily discarded: they go
back to core structural principles and provide a strong rationale for the
Supreme Court's belief that it is the ultimate expositor of the meaning of
treaties.' The Court has not abdicated this responsibility to the executive, and
with good reason. A President's short-term incentives may not be consonant
with the long-term needs of the nation.
25
Return again to our example of a President who takes a radically narrow
view of the Geneva Conventions. We stated that he might enjoy a quick rise in
his popularity and perhaps even a modest temporary increase in the nation's
safety, only to find years later that the diminished credibility of the United
States far eclipsed the short-term benefits. In the past, however, the constraint
on an executive acting in this way centered far more on the immediate reprisal
of the other power-if the United States treated German prisoners poorly in
World War II, then Germans would do the same to U.S. troops. But in the
modern era, as the world drives toward multipolarity, international questions
cannot be answered simply by saying that the United States can treat citizens of
another country in violation of international law when that particular country
122. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
123. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges asAdvicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1711-12 (1998).
124. See supra text accompanying note 29.
125. Our point is not that international law constitutes an immutable set of constraints on
executive action. Of course, it is well established that Congress may enact legislation
authorizing the executive to violate treaties. See supra note 87 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 18 n.34 (1957) (plurality opinion)). And although the President, acting unilaterally,
arguably has the constitutional authority to terminate or suspend treaties in accordance with
the terms of international law, this authority is conditioned by the express and implied
terms of the treaty itself. Our point is that there are sound structural reasons for assigning
the judiciary a more robust role in interpreting treaties that condition the exercise of
executive power. We developed this point further supra Parts I-I.
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does not object. That nation might not object because it needs American
diplomatic support, or because it fears losing foreign aid, or for some other
reason, but what matters in today's world is the reaction of many nations, not
one. 126
Posner and Sunstein suggest that our argument is self-defeating because if
a President is nearsighted, that would "be true when presidents sign treaties as
well as when they seek to evade them. 1'2'7 This is not a good argument for an
obvious structural reason. The Constitution requires treaties to be ratified by
the Senate by a supermajority.128 The supermajority Senate ratification rule acts
as a built-in constraint on a President's nearsightedness at the signing stage.
Under Posner and Sunstein's formula, however, the President would operate
under no such constraint when he sought to defy law in the executive-
constraining zone. If anything, as we point out elsewhere, under Posner and
Sunstein's approach, a supermajority of both Houses would be required to set
things right whenever the President defied law in the executive-constraining
zone. Congress would need to amend its old law, which in turn would require
a rare, almost unnatural (in today's climate due to the rise of political parties),
supermajority before Congress could restate its intent to constrain the
President. 29 In short, the structural features of the Constitution cut strongly
against Posner and Sunstein, and it is folly to think that the treaty-signature
stage is at all comparable to what these authors have in mind when they seek to
give the President the ability to violate international law.
In addition to this structural check, the lawmaking process itself imposes a
certain discipline that counteracts the shortsightedness of the President. Given
that international law in the executive-constraining zone restricts the freedom
of action of the President, the executive is motivated in the process of
126. The point is easy to spot even in the first few pages of Posner and Sunstein's article.
Consider their second highly stylized example, in which Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) seeks "to detain dangerous aliens who cannot be repatriated because
their home countries will not accept them." Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1174. They
assure us that there is no "strong case" that "foreign sovereigns would be offended" in this
example. Id. at 1175. But there is no reason to believe them. Perhaps the host country might
not be offended at the moment, but that says little about a future regime of that nation.
Moreover, it says nothing about other countries' reactions. Guantinamo Bay is not simply a
source of concern to those nations with nationals there-much of the most vehement
criticism comes from countries that do not have citizens there.
127. Id. at 1215.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur....").
129. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
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negotiating and concluding such treaties to analyze systematically the very sort
of prediction and value issues Posner and Sunstein describe-and to do so in a
way that accounts for a broad range of scenarios in which the rules might be
relevant. It is, in the end, law that is made-law that is not easily changed or
costlessly evaded. In other words, the self-binding legal outputs of this sort of
executive action encourage a more farsighted perspective. Lawmaking, in short,
is a very different enterprise than policymaking or even law-interpreting.
Moreover, the Posner and Sunstein approach would substantially weaken this
disciplining effect of the international lawmaking process by unsettling the
assumption that the law made at Time I will meaningfully constrain at Time 2.
For these reasons, the deference Posner and Sunstein seek is quite unlike
the garden-variety Chevron case, in which the agency is doing nothing more
than bringing its expertise to bear in administering a statute. The authors
partially acknowledge this, 3 ' only to disregard its importance. There are good
reasons why Chevron deference should not be awarded to agencies when they
interpret organic law in the executive-constraining zone131 -reasons that go
back to the Guardians of Plato's Republic or to the more recent allegory of foxes
and henhouses." 2
Whatever the status is of this doctrine in the domestic context, it has great
force in the foreign affairs realm. It is particularly odd that at a moment in
which international law matters tremendously to our nation's security, and that
of the world, Posner and Sunstein want to shrink its importance. Their theory
needs to take account of the massive changes wrought by World War II and its
aftermath, in which a comparatively stronger international law norm has arisen
130. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 12o8-o9.
131. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 908 (2006) (staring that an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute may only receive deference "when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority" (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., S33 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2ool)); Ernest
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 989,
lolo (1999) (arguing that Chevron should not apply "when an agency is asserting authority
outside its core powers").
132. Posner and Sunstein recognize a portion of this concern, mentioning the traditional
reluctance to defer to the Department of Justice in criminal investigations. Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1219. Their response, that Congress has delegated powers under
the AUMF, doesn't grapple with the central point. What undergirds the traditional
reluctance is the fear of presidential self-dealing- that a President can interpret a statute to
expand his own power over individuals. That fear exists in the context of foreign affairs just
as it does in the criminal prosecution context. Both constitutional law and international law
have developed precisely to check this concentration of power.
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that promotes global stability and the collective pursuit of common goals. 3
Indeed, the international legal framework within which foreign relations are
conducted was revolutionized in this era. The United Nations, whatever its
limitations, now provides a highly legitimated institutional vehicle for global
cooperation in an astonishingly wide array of substantive domains - including
national security and human rights. International human rights and
humanitarian law provide a widely accepted normative framework that defines
with increasing precision the constitutional principles of the international
order. These developments, and many others like them, provide an
institutional structure by which, and a normative framework within which,
effective and principled international cooperation is possible. Posner and
Sunstein would set that project back when the United States, and the world,
need it the most. The dramatic demands being placed on our military, as the
United States functions as the world's only superpower and predominant
policeman, mean that humanitarian treatment norms will impact our nation
greatly as we contemplate long-term deployment of troops in a variety of
countries around the world.
Critics, including Posner, advance in response a caricature of this
argument, stating that "It]here is no reason to think that if the Bush
administration improves or worsens the conditions of detention it will have
any effect on al Qeda's behavior toward captured Americans or other
westerners." '134 But that, of course, is not the argument responsible scholars
and advocates have advanced against these niggardly Geneva Convention
interpretations. The real argument is that the United States contributes to the
development of law-of-war norms when it is seen as complying with them, and
that this compliance means that nation-states that might otherwise be tempted
to treat our soldiers badly do not. A group of distinguished retired generals and
admirals argued that "other governments have begun citing United States
policy to justify their repressive policies," such as Egypt, Liberia, Zimbabwe,
Eritrea, China, and Russia."' s This claim has been a consistent theme espoused
by the uniformed military, as well as by Colin L. Powell when he served as
133. E.g., GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 77 (1994) ("The several moves made in
and after 1945 to regulate what States did to their own people came therefore as a striking
innovation, an inroad without precedent into State sovereignty as it had always been
understood....").
134. Eric Posner, Apply the Golden Rule to Al Qaeda?, WALl ST. J., July 15-16, 2006, at A9 .
135. Amicus Curiae Brief of Retired Gens. et al. at 8-9, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)
(No. 05-184), available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/GeneralsandAdmirals.pdf.
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Secretary of State.'36 The military's fears about reciprocity underscore the
dangers of relying on politicians, such as the President, to set aside
longstanding treaty commitments through the reinterpretation of those
commitments.
To be sure, the U.S. government can set international law aside. The
question is which actor of the government should possess the power to do so in
nonemergency situations. And giving that power to the President alone has
always been a terrible idea in a democracy, as Charming Betsy13 7 and its progeny
have recognized. Instead, greater deliberation about such momentous choices
is necessary. The nonapplication of Chevron deference to the realm of foreign
affairs, therefore, is justified as a deliberation-forcing measure, a point
Sunstein has appreciated in other contexts.'
Posner and Sunstein respond to the concerns about undue expansion of
executive power by claiming that presidents can have political motivations in
the domestic Chevron context and that "judges may have biases of their
own.'
3 9 Both arguments are weak. There are particular reasons to fear the
136. For example, Major General Scott Black, the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that "[t]here cannot be two standards: If
we are to hold enemy combatants to the War Crimes Act, we must be prepared to hold
U.S. personnel to the act." U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa) Holds a Hearing on the
Detainee Trials, CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, Aug. 8, 2oo6 (quoting Major General Black),
available at http://www.westlaw.com (find citation "8/3/o6 eMediaPT 12:13:oo"). He
elaborated,
The United States should be an example to the world, sir. And as we put our
soldiers in harm's way, we must always consider how they will be treated if they
are captured. Reciprocity is something that weighs heavily in all of the
discussions that we are undertaking, as we develop the process and rules for the
commissions. And that's the exact reason, sir, that the treatment of soldiers who
will be captured on future battlefields is of paramount concern.
Id. Brigadier General David M. Brahms, USMC (Ret.), a former Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, similarly warned, "Our central theme in all this has
always been our great concern about reciprocity .... We don't want someone saying they've
got our folks as captives and we're going to do to them exactly what you've done because we
no longer hold any moral high ground." Neil A. Lewis, Military Lauyers Prepare To Speak on
Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 2006, at Ai4 (quoting Brigadier General Brahms). For
Secretary of State Colin Powell's views on the subject, see Memorandum from Colin L.
Powell, Sec'y of State, to the Counsel to the President (Jan. 26, 2002), available at
http ://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/powell-memo.pdf.
137. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (holding that statutes should be construed so as to avoid
conflicts with international law).
138. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 24-
28, 31 (1999).
139. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1207.
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concentration of power in the foreign affairs context (such as process failure),
and there is no particular case to be made for political bias of the courts today.
Posner and Sunstein also offer the point that "[a]ny relevant 'bias' on the part
of the executive in the domain of foreign affairs is best understood as the
operation of democracy in action. ' This claim simply begs the question as to
what interpretive power a democracy delegates to the President. And it is
contradicted by their point, in the preceding paragraph, that these matters are
so low-visibility that public accountability is a fiction anyway.
41
The authors might have a separate response, picking up on their claim that
their theory only kicks in when a statute is "genuinely ambiguous" '42 or "vague
or ambiguous.' 43 We have no idea what this actually means. And we believe
that whatever we think it means is not what Posner and Sunstein think it
means. That, actually, is the deep point. Claims of "genuine ambiguity" are
themselves determined with reference-even sometimes unconscious
reference -to latent policy goals. If Posner and Sunstein's theory became law,
for example, we do not believe it would only impact "genuinely ambiguous"
cases; rather, it would alter the number of cases in which courts found statutes
to be "genuinely ambiguous."
Consider, in this respect, the authors' own example of Hamdan. Without
defending the proposition, they claim that the statutes at issue in the case, such
as the UCMJ, "are at least ambiguous" and that it is "not easy" to claim
otherwise.1" But this is certainly not the way the Supreme Court, or
commentators, viewed the matter.' 4 After all, the very statute that the
government relied upon to claim that the military commission was authorized
permitted trial for violations of the "laws of war. ' 14 6 The petitioner argued,
successfully, that a statute that permitted trial for violation of the laws of war
140. Id.
141. Id. at 12o6.
142. Id. at 1217.
143. Id. at 1227.
144. Id. at 1223.
145- Posner and Sunstein also find Hamdan in tension with Hamdi because the latter approved of
detentions. Id. at 1225. There is no inconsistency at all. There is a longstanding tradition of
viewing "force" as including the power to detain, given that both are forward-looking
powers of the government, in contrast to decisions about criminal guilt and innocence,
which are inherently retrospective and not included as "force." See Brief of Gen. David
Brahms & Gen. James Cullen as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-13, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (citing cases); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 58,
at 1270 (distinguishing between prospective war-fighting and retrospective justice).
146. 1o U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
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could not have contemplated such trials in a tribunal that itself violated the
laws of war.
1 47
We do not want to refight these battles in these pages. Instead, we simply
point out that the same policy concerns that animate the authors' Chevron
proposal are often doing the work when claims of statutory ambiguity are
made.148 In such settings, Posner and Sunstein's policy concerns can transform
most statutes into texts that are, to use their phrase, "at least ambiguous.
1 49
For example, the United States government pointed to these policy concerns to
explain why the treaties and statutes at issue in Hamdan did not protect Salim
Ahmed Hamdan - arguing that the President's determination, in a time of war,
itself showed that the relevant law should be read against Hamdan.'5S
By extending Chevron deference to foreign affairs decisions, therefore, the
Posner and Sunstein proposal might, perhaps unintentionally, lead to a greater
number of statutes being found "ambiguous." By centering the discussion on
the limited expertise and limited political accountability of the executive branch
in this area, as well as on the structural dangers of deference due to the veto
147. See Brief for Petitioner at 39-40, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184).
148. Take another example: Sunstein has written that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) of 1978, 5o U.S.C. §5 18o1-1862 (2000), seemingly permits the domestic surveillance
of Americans. That is not an easy claim to make. But Sunstein finds ambiguity- and in part
does so due to the same policy judgments that undergird the Posner and Sunstein theory:
[T] he question is how to square the AUMF with [FISA]. It isn't unreasonable to
say that the more specific statute, FISA, trumps the more general, so that the
wiretapping issue is effectively governed by [FISA]. But if surveillance is taken to
be an ordinary incident of war, and if the President has a plausible claim to
inherent authority, this argument is substantially weakened. Note that the
President isn't forbidden, by the precedents, from arguing that [FISA] is
unconstitutional insofar as it forbids him from engaging in the relevant activity
.... I am not sure how strong this argument is; if it is pretty strong, there is good
reason to read the AUMF to allow the President to wiretap, and not to read
[FISA] so as to forbid wiretapping, simply to avoid the hard constitutional
question.
Cass R. Sunstein, Presidential Wiretapping: Disaggregating the Issues, The University of
Chicago Law School: The Faculty Blog, Dec. 20, 2005, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/
faculty/2oo5/12/presidential wi i.html. By elevating the foreign affairs powers of the
President beyond the executive's ordinary reach, the Posner and Sunstein article risks
becoming a prism through which to view the ambiguity of statutes themselves. That is to
say, despite Posner and Sunstein's theoretical disclaimers, it is unlikely that a court that
adopted their exuberant view of executive power would find unambiguous statutes that
constrain the President as often as would a court that took a more restrained view of
executive power.
149. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1223.
150. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 81, at 23-26, 35-39, 48.
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power, we believe our proposal, which cabins deference in the executive-
constraining zone, provides a better avenue for courts to follow. '
That avenue is particularly important in cases such as Hamdan, in which
the executive possesses self-interested reasons for advancing a particular
statutory interpretation at the expense of individual liberty. It is no accident
that Chevron deference has not been extended to criminal cases. As Justice
Scalia has said:
[T]he vast body of administrative interpretation that exists-
innumerable advisory opinions not only of the Attorney General, the
OLC, and the Office of Government Ethics, but also of the Comptroller
General and the general counsels for various agencies - is not an
administrative interpretation that is entitled to deference under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The law in question
... is not administered by any agency but by the courts.... The Justice
Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to determine
for itself what this statute means, in order to decide when to prosecute;
but we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.
152
Providing Chevron deference in Hamdan-like situations creates the same
problem as providing it to the Justice Department in the ordinary criminal
prosecution context. It permits prosecutors to advance self-interested
interpretations in circumstances in which Congress may not have intended to
deprive someone of her liberty (or to deprive her of as much of her liberty as
the executive would).
Posner and Sunstein offer one other response, which is that "other canons
of interpretation, most notably constitutional avoidance, operate as a check on
executive authority.""1 3 This is a rather odd sort of check with respect to the
detainee examples. After all, both authors have acknowledged, if not endorsed,
151. Posner and Sunstein themselves unwittingly admit that legislative ambiguity is far more
common than even the Court supposes. After all, they claim that Chevron rests on the
principle that "courts defer to agency interpretations of law when and because Congress has
told them to do so"-and that this is just a "legal fiction" because "Congress hardly ever
states its instructions on the deference question with clarity." Posner & Sunstein, supra note
i, at 1194. The possibility of a "legal fiction" throws a monkey wrench into their proposal, as
it means that in the real world their proposal is not likely to be limited to cases of genuine
legal ambiguity.
152. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
153. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1228.
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previous Court decisions stating that the Constitution does not protect
detainees abroad.' Indeed, the functional absence of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance in this context is just one more reason why Chevron
rules should not apply here, because our system cannot rely on that check the
way it does in the domestic sphere.
Moreover, the nature of the underlying constitutional questions illustrates
a deeper problem with reliance on the constitutional avoidance canon, namely
that the scope and content of constitutional checks fluctuate depending on
other important legal characterizations that the President can manipulate. For
example, noncitizen enemy combatants captured and detained outside the
sovereign territory of the United States might be entitled to substantially less
constitutional protection than other persons subject to executive authority.'5
The crucial legal questions then become: Who is an "enemy"?" 6 What process
is due persons facing such a classification?' s What qualifies as the sovereign
territory of the United States ?,,8 Take another example: the proper role of
Congress and the courts in second-guessing executive action turns
substantially on whether the President acts pursuant to his inherent
constitutional authority." 9 But whether he does so turns substantially on (1)
154. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 122
n.119 (2005) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)); Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 55 n.34, OO n.248, 103 nn.263-64 (same). Posner
and Sunstein claim that they are simply describing existing law, not endorsing it. Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1225 n.178. While we think that they should take a position on
Eisentrager (and suspect that they have one), it is not at all necessary to our argument. After
all, their "description" of existing law explains why constitutional avoidance is simply not a
counterweight to their Chevron proposal -as the Constitution does not apply and therefore
the avoidance doctrine is not triggered. Indeed, the existence of Eisentrager may itself
account for why existing law has not embraced Posner and Sunstein's proposal, as the check
on executive abuse is not as great as they suppose.
iss. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (199o); id. at 277 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
156. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 763.
157. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264-65 (examining the text of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901) (extending only fundamental
rights).
158. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (holding that Guantinamo lies within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
159. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2663, 2672
n.68 (2005) ("[T]he likelihood of [constitutional] conflicts depends on judgments about the
merits-the substance of the underlying constitutional principles. If the President has
inherent authority to act in the relevant domains, then no such conflicts will arise, simply
because clear statement principles will not be required. Nor will conflicts arise if the
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how the context of his actions is characterized (is the United States at war, and
are all military detention facilities part of the battlefield?), and (2) how the
persons against whom his action is directed are classified (are the relevant
persons enemy combatants?).
The important point is that assigning the executive the kind of authority
contemplated by Posner and Sunstein would, in many circumstances, provide
an end run around the constitutional avoidance canon by permitting the
executive to redefine background facts that would impact whether the canon
would be applicable in the first place. Ultimately, providing the President with
such powers is in tension with the rule of law, for it allows the executive to
substitute case-by-case factual characterizations for law, and to do so in areas
that are concerned with restraining the powers of the executive.
The very fact that Posner and Sunstein are willing to permit a clear
statement rule before the executive deprives an individual of her constitutional
rights is itself instructive. For them, "constitutionally sensitive rights should
probably have a kind of interpretive priority" that would trump a presidential
interpretation."'6 But there is nothing obviously unique about the Constitution
that should itself justify privileging that source of rights over others. After all,
the Supremacy Clause itself provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
16,
Now it might be possible, textually, to say that the enumeration of the
Constitution as first in that list might entitle it to some special status, but
Posner and Sunstein do not offer such an argument. To the contrary, as we
show, they actually offer something closer to the reverse.
Recall Posner and Sunstein's justification for the Hamdan decision. They
claim that it can be justified as "a distinctive kind of nondelegation canon -one
that requires Congress to speak clearly if it seeks to allow the executive to
depart from the usual methods for conducting criminal trials. ' ' , 62 On this view,
Constitution's various safeguards of liberty rarely apply when the AUMF is properly
invoked.").
160. Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1223; see also id. at 1211 ("It is reasonable to say that
Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to raise a serious constitutional question and thus
that the executive may not raise such a question on its own ... .
161. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
162. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1224.
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"Hamdan rests on a distinctive clear statement principle for use of
nontraditional institutions for adjudicating guilt or innocence. '163 The problem
with this view, however, is that Posner and Sunstein do not actually believe
that this principle has anything to do with the Constitution at all. They have
already written that the Constitution does not protect individuals at
Guantinamo, so their reasoning has to depend on some sort of
nonconstitutional avoidance doctrine. They genuflect to this point, 6, only to
disregard its importance. For if avoidance doctrines can be employed in
nonconstitutional settings, as Posner and Sunstein evidently believe, there is no
principled way to insist that foreign relations settings are places exempt from
avoidance doctrines, too. At least, there is no principled way to do so without
understanding that what is actually driving the Hamdan exception for Posner
and Sunstein probably looks like the motivations driving our conception of the
executive-constraining zone. The reason why Hamdan came out the way it did
is not because it fit into some constitutional avoidance exception to Chevron,
but rather because the issue upon which the executive sought deference was
one in which it had too much self-interest at stake, as the relevant source of law
was supposed to curtail executive power.
Posner and Sunstein launch one other volley in response to our argument,
claiming that their proposal would "tether the executive to the expressed will of
Congress, [and therefore] would not give the executive lawbreaking
powers." 6 ' We acknowledge that their article at points says as much. For
example, they state early on that "[t]he domain of our analysis is restricted to
genuine ambiguities in governing law." 66 But, of course, their preceding two
paragraphs describe their article as "controversial" because they claim "that the
executive branch should be given greater power than it currently has to decide
whether the United States will violate international law.' ', 67 And to make the
point even clearer, they go on to say that "[a]n additional implication, and an
especially controversial one, is that comity-related ambiguities in any grant of
power to the President, including an authorization to use force, should be
settled by the executive, even if international law is inconsistent with the
executive's view."'
68
163. Id. at 1225.
164. See id. at 1224 ("[T]he use of a clear statement principle of this sort would be easiest to
defend if it were undergirded by the Due Process Clause.").
165. Id. at 1199.
166. Id. at 1178.
167. Id. at 1177 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 1178 (emphasis added).
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While we appreciate that the two authors may be approaching the matter
from different perspectives, their bipolar analysis makes it impossible to
evaluate, as any evaluation prompts a shell game, in which they use one or
another of these two poles to respond to potential criticism. We therefore have
concentrated our response on one strand of their proposal, which advocates
giving the President more deference than he "currently has" when he
"violate[s] international law. ','6,
Of course, Posner and Sunstein might suggest that our broader claim in
this Section does not provide any reason to reject their proposal in full. At
most, they might argue, we have demonstrated the need for a nondelegation
canon for actions in violation of international law of a certain character. In
other words, they might argue that Chevron deference to the executive in
foreign affairs law is appropriate in general, irrespective of any nondelegation
canons that might limit its application in specific contexts. On one level, this is
certainly correct. On a deeper level, though, we submit that the scope and
content of the nondelegation canon our argument supports would bar the
application of their proposal in the category of cases in which it is most likely to
make any difference at all.
D. The Withering of Congress's Role
If adopted, one of the most dangerous byproducts of Posner and Sunstein's
theory may be to weaken, as a practical matter, the ability of Congress to
legislate meaningful constraints on executive power. Members of Congress,
when enacting legislation, would now have to contemplate whether any
statutory ambiguities would be used to permit the President to violate
longstanding treaty commitments.' 7' The result of their proposal, ex ante, may
be to instill trepidation in Congress about enacting legislation in the first place.
For example, imagine how Congress, under the Posner and Sunstein
model, would react to an administration's request to pass a Use of Force
Resolution. Members would have to fear that such legislation could be used by
the President in the future as a blank check to permit him to disregard
international law. The upshot of such fear is that they might not pass such a
statute at all. Instead, some would predictably embrace theories about the
169. Id. at 1177.
170. Posner and Sunstein, in an odd choice for supposed realists, respond by stylizing their
problem as one of the President versus the courts, claiming that "Chevronizing foreign
relations law would not reduce legislative power; it would reduce judicial power." Id. at
120o n.94. That might be a nice theoretical model, but it does not appear to grapple with the
deep-seated legislative inertia problem.
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"inherent" right of the President to use military force in times of crisis; others
would simply stay quiet and let the President use force. The alternative to
legislative silence-that Congress would have to enact such laws with such a
degree of specificity (for example, no domestic spying, no torture, no indefinite
detentions) - would demand such high foresight and political maneuvering
that it would often be safer for Congress to decide to do nothing.
The risk of furthering congressional inactivity exists even with
contemporary presidential interpretations of the AUMF. Congress already has
to fear, with or without Chevron deference, that the executive will distort its
statutes to permit activities that it did not intend. 71 But what stops that risk
from flowering today is the courts -which have reassured Congress that it can
pass something like the AUMF and not have it interpreted in ludicrous ways by
the executive. 172 In this respect, cases such as Rasul v. Bush173 and Hamdan are
not only democracy-forcing ex post in that they compel Congress to act to give
the executive additional powers in those specific areas; they are also
democracy-forcing ex ante. They reassure the legislature that it can pass laws
without having them subject to wild-eyed, self-interested interpretations by
the executive.
By contrast, Posner and Sunstein's proposal would encourage executive
branch gamesmanship and might lead, ex ante, to fewer congressional
enactments in the area. Congress would have to fear the risk of unwittingly
authorizing a variety of activities that it could not adequately foresee, and it
would therefore stay silent. The result would be to further the democratic
deficit that already plagues the nation in the legal war on terror -in which the
171. As George Will has recently put it:
The next time a president asks Congress to pass something akin to what
Congress passed on Sept. 14, 2001-the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF)- the resulting legislation might be longer than Proust's "Remembrance
of Things Past." Congress, remembering what is happening today, might
stipulate all the statutes and constitutional understandings that it does not intend
the act to repeal or supersede.
But, then, perhaps no future president will ask for such congressional
involvement in the gravest decision government makes-going to war. Why
would future presidents ask, if the present administration successfully asserts its
current doctrine? It is that whenever the nation is at war, the other two branches
of government have a radically diminished pertinence to governance, and the
president determines what that pertinence shall be.
George F. Will, No Checks, Many Imbalances, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at A27.
172. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519-21 (2004) (plurality opinion) (interpreting
the AUMF in light of "longstanding law-of-war principles," including the Geneva
Conventions).
173. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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President has been acting without the explicit support of the legislature. This
presidential netherworld is bad for the reputation of the United States, as well
as for our deliberative democracy.
There is no way to "prove" that such a result would follow from Posner and
Sunstein's proposal short of adopting it and watching what would unfold. But
the abdication of Congress for the five years after the September 11, 2001,
attacks in many of the key decisions in this realm suggests that strong
deference claims might make it harder to enact legislation. That view gains
some support from structural principles as well. After all, our Founders set up
the tripartite government to make it difficult for government to take action that
deprives people of their rights. Short of an emergency that precluded Congress
from acting, the concurrence of any one branch alone in such a scheme was not
considered enough to change the status quo baseline.7 4 Instead, Congress had
to pass a law, the President had to enforce the law, and the courts had to
uphold the law. All three branches thus had to agree under this constitutional
framework -a key feature of the document that led to greater deliberation and
dialogue among the branches.
Posner and Sunstein would flip that standard assumption. Under their
view, Congress would necessarily have to fear that its authorizing legislation,
in a world of Chevron deference, could be used for radically unintended
purposes. It would be entirely natural for the legislative body, faced with such a
dilemma, to be led down the path of doing nothing at all. This problem does
not manifest itself as much in the domestic context, as there Congress has to
act before the President can change the status quo. In the foreign policy arena,
however, Congress knows that the President can always use his "inherent
authority" to use military force regardless of what it does, and it may therefore
find it safer to stay silent than to legislate.
Posner and Sunstein respond to these arguments by suggesting that their
proposal would force more, not less, legislative restriction over the President.7 '
They surmise that a future Congress "might issue a more detailed AUMF, one
that more carefully described the entities against which force could be used and
the limits under which the President might operate, rather than leaving those
issues to a President it did not trust or to courts that had no expertise in the
area. " 176 Their last words are just one tip-off among many that this claim is a
weak one. After all, if Congress didn't trust the courts, the status quo provides
174. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DuKE L.J. 1335, 1368-69
(2001) (discussing the Constitution's "rights-protecting asymmetry," which requires the
concurrence of all branches); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 58, at 1268-69 (same).
175. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note i, at 1199.
176. Id.
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it plenty of opportunities to craft a more calibrated AUMF. But of course
Congress hasn't done that, and the reasons have little to do with distrust of the
courts. The reason why a more detailed AUMF is only conceivable in the
University of Chicago Roundtable, as opposed to the halls of Congress, is that
Congress will never be able, as a practical matter, to legislate with the necessary
prospectivity. It did not foresee the National Security Agency (NSA) program
or military commissions in the 2001 AUMF, and it is unlikely to be able to
foresee the next round of programs either. (Recall that the executive branch
has repeatedly justified its failure to inform Congress of the NSA program on
the ground that even debate about the program would reveal details of our
intelligence activities that Congress and our enemies do not currently know.)177
In the real world, it is far easier for Congress to do nothing than to do
something. And doing nothing is going to be the ultimate result if Congress
has to fear that every time it does something it has to anticipate every possible
claim of authorization for practices that would otherwise violate the law. It is
also difficult to know what to make of claims like Posner and Sunstein's
hypothetical revised AUMF, as such claims contradict a key tenet of their piece,
that "the executive has expertise and flexibility, can keep secrets, can efficiently
monitor developments, and can act quickly and decisively; the other branches
cannot.' 78 If the upshot of their proposal truly is, as they claim, to further
restrict what the President may do, then it would seem to be in deep tension
with their view of what promotes national security. It would follow that, just
on their terms alone, their proposal would be a bad idea because it would lead
Congress to shackle the executive although the executive has structural
superiority in waging war.
There is one final problem with this approach, which is that it contradicts
what the authors themselves describe as "the premise of [their] argument,
taken from Chevron .... that Congress must delegate its powers because it
does not have the time and resources to regulate." '179 (For the record, we
severely doubt that the decisions in the war on terror that implicate the
executive-constraining zone are ones that can be analogized to garden-variety
EPA disputes, not simply because "time and resources" can obviously be
177. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Senator Arlen Specter,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Feb. 3, 20o6), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/surveillance17.pdf ("(W]e were advised by members of Congress that it would
be difficult, if not impossible to pass such legislation without revealing the nature of the
program and the nature of certain intelligence capabilities. That disclosure would likely have
harmed our national security, and that was an unacceptable risk we were not prepared to
take.").
178. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1202.
179. Id. at 1216.
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devoted to the war on terror but also because the executive has claims of
inherent authority over war powers that themselves act as a disincentive for
Congress to legislate.) If that is the premise of their argument, it is baffling to
see, as their response to the withering of Congress's role, a claim that somehow
they would be energizing Congress. Either Congress is going to be a player or
it is not. Our view is that the best way to encourage Congress to be a player is
(i) to make sure that Congress does not have to fear that every authorization of
force becomes a license for the executive to do whatever it wants, and (2) to
make sure that the veto does not become a tool to entrench erroneous
interpretations of law that favor the President.
E. One Precondition to Deference: Bureaucratic Expertise
Finally, even if some sort of deference to the executive is appropriate, a
precondition for deference should be the use of internal executive processes
that permit balanced decision-making. Recall once again that the executive's
claim to legitimacy stems in part from its expertise. Apart from the Article III
judiciary, the only other viable actor in our government with a long-term view
is the bureaucracy.
Posner and Sunstein, however, want to permit Chevron deference even if no
formal procedure and no channels triggering Chevron are involved.1s As one of
us has argued elsewhere, separation of powers should be moving toward a
model that encourages checks and balances within the executive branch. 1
Different bureaucratic agencies have the potential to provide these checks -for
example, the State Department can check the Defense Department and vice
versa. Because each agency has a different core mission, agencies will tend to
bring different perspectives to bear on solving a problem. These perspectives
emerge even when the very same players shift employment from one agency to
another-so that Colin Powell as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may
articulate a different position than he does while serving as Secretary of State.
For those checks to work best, vibrant civil service protections are often
necessary so that employees feel they can do their jobs without reprisal.
Agencies might consider borrowing here from the foreign service, in which
longstanding policies create the conditions for a bureaucracy that is,
comparatively speaking, focused on long-term horizons. Indeed, the State
Department has explicit procedures in place that permit foreign service officers
to dissent and warn Washington of actions they consider to be problematic in
i8o. Id. at 1198.
181. See Karyal, supra note 53.
1279
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the field. The Foreign Service Officer who uses this "dissent channel" in the
most productive way each year wins an award."12
When agencies adopt procedures like those present in the State
Department, the case for deference to decisions that emerge from such
processes becomes much stronger. But when claims of a "unitary executive"
become so strong that they permit a President to compress or eliminate agency
processes through political influence, and to bypass interagency debate
altogether, deference is not being awarded on the basis of expertise. In this
respect, the growth of Schedule C appointees, and the politicization of the
bureaucracy more generally, i"3 poses a long-term challenge to Chevron
deference. To the extent such deference is rooted in expertise and not in
executive accountability, its underpinnings grow increasingly flaccid.'84
Yet much of Posner and Sunstein's claim is built on considerations of
presidential "expertise." To be sure, the President has a State Department, a
Defense Department, law-of-war experts, and the Judge Advocates General at
his disposal, but each of these entities can be cut out under streamlined
presidential decision-making. One way of viewing our point is to say that when
Congress is "delegating" interpretive power to the President, it is doing so
under the assumption that the President will use existing channels and
procedures. If the President truncates them, however, the arguments in favor
of Chevron deference are weakened significantly. Bureaucracy functions as a
check on the tendency of presidents to act in their short-term interest, by
creating a cadre of officers who adopt a long-term perspective. But Posner and
Sunstein would give the President the power to short-circuit all of these
institutions and to then reap the benefit by seeking deference in court
challenges to his decision.
For this reason, if deference to presidential decision-making in this area is
important for policy reasons, the authors should first develop procedures to
improve that decision-making process. Such deference may be appropriate
when the internal process of decision-making functionally replicates the
divided government that our Founders expected when they separated the
branches, but not in the absence of such processes. In this respect, courts could
jump-start the process of creating internal checks and balances by saying that
Chevron deference in nonemergency situations would be available in this area
only when standard interagency processes were used.
182. Id. at 2328-29.
183. Id. at 2322.
184. Such changes in government make the executive more accountable, but not vis-a-vis the
legislature. Accountability in the foreign affairs context, in any event, is not as significant a
factor. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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To make the discussion more concrete, for example, one might view
Hamdan as an anti-Chevron case. On this view, the Justices consciously refused
to award deference to the presidential determinations at issue because those
determinations bypassed existing institutions. 8 , With a bureaucracy that had
been ignored (Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice were both cut out of the military commission plan),186 the
Court was not really being asked to defer to a plan drafted or endorsed by
experts. In this respect, Hamdan's failure to invoke Chevron is not "puzzling" at
all. 87 The Court recognized that such deference is appropriate, at best, when
the decisions are actually being made by experts. To be sure, the President has
accountability advantages (and comparative expertise advantages vis-t-vis the
judiciary), but he does not possess those same advantages over Congress. In a
case such as Hamdan, in which the claims pit the powers of Congress against
those of the President, deference to the latter can be appropriate, at most, only
when the executive can present the argument as the product of deliberative and
sober bureaucratic decision-making. There may be a number of ways to create
that deliberative process, ranging from an interagency process with
bureaucratic overlap that intentionally creates friction to notice-and-comment
procedures. But in nonemergency situations, if snap decisions are being made
in ways that cut out many of the relevant actors, the case for deference should
be weaker.'
88
185. For an extended version of this argument, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment: Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes To Practice, 12o HAR'v. L. REv. 65 (20o6).
186. The military commission trial "plan was considered so sensitive that senior White House
officials kept its final details hidden from the president's national security adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, and the secretary of state, Colin L. Powell, officials said. It was so urgent,
some of those involved said, that they hardly thought of consulting Congress" and the
longstanding "interagency debate" process was largely ignored. Tim Golden, After Terror, a
Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
187. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1178.
188. Posner and Sunstein state that existing law does not consider internal procedures a
precondition for deference. See id. at 1213-14. Their only citation here is to a case that they
acknowledge cuts the other way, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). We
understand, of course, that existing law does not generally peer deeply into administrative
processes, though there are exceptions. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. Of
course, courts may be using subterfuge to peer into these processes without actually saying
so-a strategy that has significant advantages. See Katyal, supra note 18S, at 112 ("Such a
rationale might be difficult for the Justices to embrace any more openly . . . .Brazenly
advocating for a different executive branch process could potentially undermine the
legitimacy of the Court .... Any second-guessing of the Executive could take place, if at all,
only between the lines of a judicial opinion ..... (citing GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBIrr, TRAGic CHOICES 21-28 (1978))).
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If courts were explicit about such reasoning, it would further Posner and
Sunstein's goals tremendously. Then deference could be awarded on the basis
of a well-reasoned and debated policy decision that was the product of a variety
of different actors, some of whom have a long-term perspective. Without such
a process in place, however, deference can become a doctrine to permit
presidents to be awarded for their short-term, politically motivated decisions
when these decisions do not redound to the long-term interests of the United
States. And that sad result is something that the federal court system-the only
other entity structurally focused on the long term - cannot stomach. So it is not
at all surprising that courts are policing the nation's interests to make sure that
such decisions are the product of both democratic deliberation and careful
reflection by experts. The executive branch has sometimes leaned on rather
specious accountability arguments when it has gone around its experts in the
bureaucracy. In response, courts should strike a counterbalance by weighing
the role of Congress, a branch with unquestionable democratic accountability,
as well as cast its doctrine to ensure that the executive at least hears the views of
bureaucratic experts.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the propriety of existing canons of judicial deference to the
executive in foreign relations, we maintain that the scope of this deference
should not increase. The real purchase of calls for increased deference in this
domain, such as the Posner and Sunstein proposal, is that they invite deference
to the executive's interpretation of- and even the executive's decision to
breach-law designed to condition the exercise of its own powers. In our view,
substantial deference to the executive is singularly inappropriate in a large
swath of cases eligible for Chevron deference under Posner and Sunstein's
proposal: namely, foreign relations law that operates in the executive-
constraining zone. Courts have scrutinized, and should continue to scrutinize,
executive interpretation of international law that has the status of supreme
federal law; that is made, at least in part, outside the executive; and that
conditions the exercise of executive power. Failure to do so dramatically
increases the power of the President in ways that would be contrary to the
nation's interests and discourages the executive from developing important
In any event, whether existing law does in fact consider internal procedures in a garden-
variety EPA challenge is irrelevant to our claim, which is that when courts are considering
law in the executive-constraining zone, the risk of self-dealing requires heightened
sensitivity to methods that check and divide power. Internal separation of powers, of course,
is one mechanism to do that.
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internal checks on presidential power. It also leads to far less congressional
regulation of the executive. In short, substantial deference to the executive in
this domain undermines the capacity of all three branches to promote the
development of an effective, principled foreign relations law.
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